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This study looks at service delivery in the context of failed states. The objective of 
this study is to investigate whether state failure in its provisioning capacity of basic 
services to its citizens has led to the proliferation of militia groups in Kenya.  
 
The study draws upon secondary sources of literature such as research reports, 
articles, journals, and academic documents, classifications of militia groups, 
population growth and government service provision in Kenya since 
independence, and the basic needs of the poor in the slums to retrieve relevant 
information on the dimensions of fragility. Reports on the analysis of census data 
since 1963-2009 are reviewed to investigate whether government services in 
Kenya have been improving or deteriorating. Further, two main militia groups in 
Kenya: the Mungiki and SLDF (Sabaot Land Defence Force) are analysed to 
determine their agenda and activities. 
 
The study shows that government services have declined since independence 
especially to the poor population. This decline in service delivery has been 
attributed to many factors but primarily due to population increase since 
independence. This has led to growth of slums due the second wave of 
urbanization, which has resulted in more and poorer people moving to urban 
centres, especially cities. The government’s ability to match this growth has 
remained wanting and it has been unable to deliver services adequately to the 
urban poor. This change in demographics has resulted in weakening of the 
governments financial and management capacity to match the growth in 
population. Some of the old government policies dealing with service delivery are 
still in effect today, however, they have not been revised to adapt to the new 
challenges facing the country. The policy making process and implementation has 
not matched the growth of cities and population growth. Therefore many 















The decline in the government’s ability to deliver has not been without 
consequences. Alternative forces have emerged to provide these basic services. 
Firstly there are private enterprises that provide security, water, sanitation, and 
public transport regulation among other services. However, most of the urban 
poor cannot afford these services as they come at a premium. Therefore criminal 
groups have emerged to take advantage of this vacuum in the provision of basic 
services to the poor, usually at low and affordable costs. Relationships have 
therefore been formed between this criminal groups and the community that are 
either parasitic, where these criminal groups leach on the community or symbiotic 
where benefits are mutual. It then becomes difficult for the state to penetrate these 
communities. 
 
A detailed case study of the Mungiki and the SLDF shows that these criminal 
groups referred to here as militia have been in existence since independence. 
However they have morphed overtime and in the context of this study we show 
that their agenda and activities have changed. They now play a role that is 
otherwise played by the government due to its failure in meeting the basic needs of 
its citizens. They are now providing services such as security usually preying on 
communities but sometimes performing what communities see as a necessary evil 
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The quest for better service delivery by the state to its citizens is one of those 
beguiling challenges facing many countries in Africa. Many developing countries’ 
policies fail to trickle down1 to address the needs of all population, especially the 
poor, thus excluding them from mainstream service delivery: Service delivery in 
this study refers to those basic services that a government is required to provide to its 
citizens such as water, electricity, sanitation and security2. Therefore, this lack 
creates service delivery “gaps” that alternative forces in the community seek to fill.   
 
Governments are elected by citizens to represent them and are responsible to 
ensure that the services are delivered to their citizenry. Failure in service delivery 
then erodes the state’s legitimacy due to its weakened provisioning capacity3. As a 
result, externalization of major state functions occurs. Security and other service 
provision becomes a shared affair by the state, militia, private firms and individual 
initiatives4. Underlying this is a systematized weakening of the state.  
 
As a result, African states lag behind all other regions of the world on all the basic 
human needs’ indicators thus facing the multidimensional crises of 
underdevelopment-economic, political, security, across the continent5. In most 
                                                     
1 “Tickle Down” is used in this thesis to mean that the government policies are not being implemented to reach all its 
population especially those of the low-income population. As a result, the low-income population is not enjoying the basic 
government services that they ought to be having, such as water, electricity, sanitation etc. 
2 Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2011). State Fragility and Governance: Conflict Mitigation and sub national perspective. Development 
policy review. 29(2): 131-153 
3 OECD/DAC. (2008). Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons. Journal on Development. 9 
(3) 
4  Batley, R. and Mcloughlin, C. (2010). Engaging with non-state service providers in Fragile states: Reconciling State Building 
and Service Delivery. Development Policy Review, 28(2), pp 131-154 














cases, the states therefore become irrelevant to the lives of the vast majority of the 
African people.  
 
This study looks at service delivery in the context of failed states.  The study 
contributes valuable insight that can be used in future scholarships on the area of 
failed states and service delivery. More specifically, the study focuses on service 
delivery in Kenya. It attempts to link the proliferation of militia groups in Kenya to 
the state’s failure in its provisioning capacity of the basic services to the poor 
communities. 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
There has been a rampant rise in the incidence of militia emergence and activities 
in Kenya. Today, there are over 30 militia groups operating in different parts of the 
country. These are typically young people who feel locked out of the mainstream 
political process and are united by a common, if not always clearly articulated, 
social or political agenda expressed by violent means6. The most dominant ones 
are the Mungiki, SLDF, Taliban, Bagdad Boys, Sungu Sungu and the Kamjesh, 
commonly referred to as the “Big Six”. These groups further mutate and give rise to 
smaller criminal gangs that spread further to other parts of the country.  
 
This rampant rise of militia groups in Kenya was greatly experienced during the 
2008 contested presidential election results. However, these militia groups existed 
prior to the violent election clashes although they were not as prominent. The 
expression of frustration at the imperfect election process by opposition 
supporters degenerated into ethnically targeted attacks, countered by ethnic 
militia groups7. Opposition supporters went on a violent rampage in several parts 
of the country, most noticeable in the slums of Nairobi, Rift valley and the Nyanza 
province. As a result, targeted ethnic violence escalated, and focused mainly on 
                                                     
6 Nyabola, H. N. (2009). 'The Legal Challenge of Civil Militia Groups in Kenya', ISS African Security Review, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 















communities living outside their traditional settlement areas. This then 
degenerated into full-scale retaliatory attacks8 
 
This is commonplace in Kenya, where community-based militia groups frequently 
emerge in response to a perceived threat against the integrity of the community. In 
addition, they emerge to protect specific economic or political interests and may 
include individuals from variety of social backgrounds, most noticeably the urban 
poor. 
 
These Militia groups are one of the greatest security threats in present-day Kenya. 
According to various news reports, the militias are responsible for crimes ranging 
from murder, extortion in the city to sexual abuse of women as a campaign against 
indecent dressing9. These militia groups prey on the poorest by taking over the 
slums and setting up huge extortion rackets. They attempt to gain control of entire 
neighborhoods where the central government has little or no impact, brutally 
killing anyone that opposes their rule.  
 
Further complicating the issue is the fact that clashes between the different militia 
groups are increasingly common, because individuals outside a dominant militia 
ethnic base-such as the Mungiki- are trying to organize themselves into militia 
groups too for counter attacks. On 3 March 2002 a violent clash between the 
Mungiki and the Taliban groups in Nairobi’s Kariobangi North estate left 20 local 
residents dead and 31 in hospital, highlighting the increasing gravity of the 
situation10. 
 
                                                     
8 Kagwanja, P. (2003). Facing Mount Kenya or facing Mecca. The Mungiki, ethnic violence and the politics of the Moi 
succession in Kenya, 1987-2002. African Affairs, 102, 25-49. 
9 Kagwanja, P. (2003). Facing Mount Kenya or facing Mecca. The Mungiki, ethnic violence and the politics of the Moi 
succession in Kenya, 1987-2002. African Affairs, 102, 25-49. 
10 Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya, 531; IRIN News, Kenya:  
Rights activists decry circumcision threat, integrated regional information networks, 2008, http:// 













Therefore, this study investigates the proliferation of these civil militias in the 
context of failure by government to deliver services to its citizens. This study will 
investigate how the state’s failure in its provisioning capacity has created 
opportunities for alternative forces to arise. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
This research investigates whether state failure in its provisioning capacity of basic 
services to its citizens has created ‘gaps’ that have led to the emergence organized 
criminal groups in Kenya.  
 
This study also considers that there has been extensive research conducted on 
organic and organized criminal groups in Kenya, commonly referred to as militia 
formations. Ngunyi et al explores organic and organized criminal groups in Kenya. 
He looks at their formation and mapping, as well as how they are a threat to 
government11. Further, Okumu and Ikelegbe, explore militias in Kenya as a cause of 
human insecurity12. Other scholars such as Dr. Mutuma Ruteere have also studied 
the formation and security threat of militia groups in Kenya and Africa. However, 
most of these studies have shown little to no connection of militia groups to state 
policy failure. Therefore, this study seeks to connect the proliferation of militia 
groups in Kenya in the context of government failure to deliver services to its 
citizens. 
 
                                                     
11 Mutahi Ngunyi And Musambayi Katumanga (2011) From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence: An Exploration of Organic 
and Organised Crime in Kenya (UNDP, Nairobi) 
12 Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (2010). Militias, Rebels and Islamists Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crisis 















1.3 Research Questions 
a) Is the proliferation of organised criminal groups in Kenya a function of state 
policy failure?  
b) If so, what are the implications on service delivery to the community?  
 
1.4 Significance of the study 
There is a general consensus that the Post- Independence African States have 
failed to address and meet the needs of the predominant majority of the people of 
Africa13. As Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar argue, “… The failure of the state in 
Africa is so uncontested that both the scholarly discussions and policy concerns have 
increasingly shifted to what is called “civil society”14. For this reason, Africa lags 
behind all other regions of the world on all the basic human needs’ indicators thus 
facing the multidimensional crises of underdevelopment-economic, political, and 
security across the continent15.  
 
In most cases, the state has therefore become irrelevant to the lives of the vast 
majority of the African people. However, there are no significant scholarships that 
look at service delivery in the context of failed states, thus trying to bridge the gap 
between the state roles to the citizenry. Therefore, this study intends to contribute 
valuable insight that can be used in future scholarships on the area of failed states 
and service delivery. 
 
                                                     
13 Klay,G.K. (2009). Reconstituting the Neo-Colonial State in Africa. Journal of Third world studies, vol XXVI, No.1 
14 Abdi Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar. (2002). The African State: Reconsiderations. eds. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann,. 286 
pp. 














1.5 Research Methodology 
State fragility is one of the challenges facing many African countries.  As a result of 
state fragility, government service provision to the citizens especially the poor has 
continued to deteriorate over the decades.  This has led to poor economic growth, 
increase in poverty, and increase in crime and corruption in these African 
countries. Kenya is no exception. As a result of the state failing, we have seen other 
alternative forces such as the militia rising in place of the state to illegally provide 
basic services to the poor e.g. electricity, water and sanitation. This research 
therefore seeks to investigate whether the proliferation of these militia groups in 
Kenya is as a result of state policy failure, and what are the implications on 
services delivery to the community.  
 
This research mainly uses secondary data. Different sets of research reports, 
articles, journals, academic documents, in-country and out-country generated 
literature are reviewed, analysed, and compared in order to come up with the 
relevant information for this research. These documents touch on various field of 
study that inform this research such as state fragility and its components, 
classification of militias- their mapping in Kenya, population growth in Kenya since 
independence, government service provision since independence and the basic 
needs of the poor in slum areas. Other policies and legal documents related to 
service provision in Kenya such as the new and the old constitution are also 
reviewed.  These documents have been sourced directly from various academic 
sources and websites, universities, organisations that deal with the plight of the 
poor, government press and website, as well as individual scholars in Kenya. 
Although there has been some limitation in collecting data from the government 
website such as the census data and analysis, these information could be retrieved 
from organisations that are directly involved with government research. 
 
Primary data was not the main source of information for this research. However, 
two unstructured interviews were conducted with a political scientist and a policy 













assumptions made in literature and generated new knowledge and understanding 
of state fragility, policy inadequacy and the militia problem in Kenya. Their input 
enriched the findings in the secondary data.  
 
Due to time constraints, the research only focused on two militia groups operating 
in specific slum areas in Kenya. This has not affected the outcome of the research, 
as most of the other militia groups replicate the activities and objectives of these 
main militia groups selected for the research.  
 
In analyzing the militia groups, the research greatly relied on secondary data. Due 
to individual security and safety, it is hard to interview the militia groups directly.  
 
1.6 Limitation of Study 
a) Some required resources on security were not readily available due to their 
sensitive nature such as reports on the application of the old and new security 
architecture in Kenya. 
b) Travel limitation. Since the researcher is based in South Africa, there were travel 
limitations to Kenya to collect some of the needed data. Therefore, data collection 
took longer than anticipated. 
c) Access to online data: Accessing data from online sources in Kenya proved to be 















1.7 Organisation of the Study 
This research study is presented in six chapters.  
Chapter 1 includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, 
research question, significance of the study, research methodology, and the 
limitations of the study. 
 
Chapter II presents a review of the literature, which includes state fragility and 
policy inadequacy, types of militia groups, and the causes of rise of militia groups 
around the world.  
 
Chapter III reviews the structure and functions of the Kenyan government, political 
history of Kenya and the regulatory legal framework that deals with criminal gangs 
in Kenya.  
 
Chapter IV describes the origin and rise of Militia groups in Kenya; specifically 
focusing on the Mungiki and the SLDF.  
 
Chapter V presents the relationship between state policy failure and the rise of 
Militia groups in Kenya. Further, it looks at the relationship between Militia groups 
and citizen demands, as well as the implications of state policy failure to service 
delivery in the community.  
 
Chapter VI provides a summary of the entire study, discussion of the findings, 














2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The State is more often than not viewed as a powerful overarching entity that 
effectively controls a geo-political domain and acts as an engine of growth and 
development16 However, the problem is that the state has not always played the 
role it is expected to play. The states that have been unable to discharge their 
normal functions and drive forward development are referred to here as “fragile 
states”. ‘Africa in particular is considered as having the largest concentration of 
prototypical fragile states characterised by weak institutions, poverty, social 
inequalities, corruption, civil strife, armed conflicts and civil wars’17. The 
assumption here is that, fragile states create “gaps” for the proliferation of 
alternative forces to perform the functions of the state. 
 
Therefore, this chapter looks at fragile states as defined by various scholars, the 
conceptual overview and theories of state fragility, and the relationship between 
state fragility and policy failure. Further, the chapter explores the different 






                                                     
16 Osaghae, E. (2007). Fragile State. Development in Practice, Vol. 17, No. 4/5 pp. 691 













2.2 State Fragility: The Conceptual Overview, Historical 
Background and Theories 
2.2.1 What is State Fragility? A Conceptual Overview 
The concept of fragile states has been popularised by the World Bank and the 
international development community since the 1990s18. World Bank defines 
fragile states based on its Country Political and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
rating, which assesses governance and a country’s ability to use development aid 
effectively19. However, the perspective of the World Bank and the international 
development community has not always tallied with local perspectives therefore 
making it necessary to adopt a balanced approach in interrogating the concept of 
fragile states.  
 
For better understanding of the concept, this section explores the meaning and 
characteristics of a state, which identifies it as a stable or ideal state. The 
assumption here is that the concept of fragile states is a relative concept suggesting 
a deviance from the ideal state. 
 
Origins of a State 
Originally, the word ‘state’ was derived from the Latin word “status” meaning 
“condition”20. In Europe, after the revival of the Roman law in the 14th century, this 
Latin word was used to refer to the legal standing of people such as noble, common 
and clerical. The word ‘state’ was also associated with Roman ideas about the 
“status rei publicae” which means the “condition of public matters”. However, with 
                                                     
18 World Bank. (2006). Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG report of World Bank support to low-income countries under 
stress. Washington, DC: World Bank; AND OECD. (2008).  Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: 
From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, Paris: OECD, p 12. 
19 World Bank. (2009). Fragility and Conflict. Available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22230573~pagePK:64
171531~menuPK:4448982~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html {accessed on 7th March 2012] 
20 Hay, Colin (2001). "State theory". In Jones, R.J. Barry. Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy: Entries 













time, it lost its reference to particular social groups and became associated with 
the legal order of the entire society and the apparatus of its enforcement21.  
 
Early works of Machiavelli in the 16th century played a central role in popularising 
the word “state” to its modern sense22. Machiavelli coined the Italian term “lo 
stato” where the word “state” is also derived, which describes the whole social 
hierarchy that governs or rules a country. However, over the centuries, the term 
has come to take meanings that are more sophisticated.  
 
Currently, there is no academic consensus on the appropriate definition of the 
state. More often than not, political theorists have commonly used Max Weber 
definition of the state. He describes a state as:  
"…A relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate 
violence" - Max Weber: Politik als Beruf, 1919 
 
In the Weberian point of view, a state is an entity that has a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of physical force within its border for the enforcement of its order23. 
In other words, Max Weber describes a state as a compulsory political organisation 
with a centralised government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force within a certain territory24. 
                                                           
 
John Locke view of the state contrasts with this Weberian view of the state. In the 
Lockean view, the state is a vehicle for fulfilling a social contract. John Locke in his 
article “The second treatise of government”25 argues that for the government to 
                                                     
21 Skinner, Quentin (1989). "The state". In Ball, T; Farr, J.; and Hanson, R.L.. Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. 
Cambridge University Press. pp. 90–131 
22 Bobbio, Norberto (1989). Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power. University of Minnesota 
Press 
23 Sekhar, C.S.C., (2010). Fragile States. Journal of Developing Societies (Sage Publications Inc.), 26(3), pp. 265.  
24 Cudworth, Erika et al. (2007). The Modern State: Theories and Ideologies. Edinburgh University Press. 
25 John Locke (1690). Two Treatise of Government. [Available at: 













come into being, the people have to agree that their condition in the state of nature 
is unsatisfactory, and so agree to transfer some of their rights to a central 
government, while they retain others26. In this view, the state does not have 
monopoly over the use of force, but works with the people to maintain order and 
provide security within its territory. 
 
Characteristics of an Ideal State 
An ideal state is commonly referred to as having attributes such as: strong and 
effective institutions; control over its territory; stable and cohesive population; 
sovereign and legitimate power within its territory; adequate resources to ensure 
the well being of its citizens; and respect and recognition by other states in the 
global community27. 
 
Antonio Gramsci conveys an ideal state as having two major super structural 
entities:  the political society, which is the state, and the civil society. The political 
society is the arena of political institutions and legal constitutional control. It rules 
directly through the coercive and juridical instruments of domination28 while Civil 
Society is the private non-state sphere that promotes ethical values among the 
population through the exercise of cultural and ideological dominance. Therefore, 
according to Gramsci, the state is not only defined by its attributes, but also by the 
constitutional and institutional control it has over its function. With this definition, 
it is therefore easier to ascertain whether the state is in a fragile state due to its 
failure to provide basic services to its citizenry, or due to failure of the 
implementation structures. 
 
With changing realities and paradigm shift since the cold war period, an ideal state 
has been revised to include good governance, poverty alleviation and economic 
growth and development. Combining all these attributes, the core function of an 
                                                     
26 Uzgalis, William, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
[available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/] Accessed on 29th Feb 2012 
27 Osaghae, E. (2007). Fragile State. Development in Practice, Vol. 17, No. 4/5 pp. 692 













‘ideal state’ can be summarised as ‘maintaining monopoly over the use of force 
within its territory and performing functions of a welfare state’29.  
 
What then is a Fragile State? 
The concept of ‘fragile state’ is a relative concept suggesting a deviance and 
aberration from the ideal state. There is no universally accepted definition of 
fragile states. However, different scholars and institutions have attempted to 
define the concept.  
 
The term ‘fragile state’ has gradually replaced earlier concepts such as difficult 
partnerships, countries at risk, failing states, difficult environments, and low-
income countries under stress. This gradual replacement of earlier concepts that 
defined weak states came about after the adoption of the Paris Declaration on AID 
effectiveness in March 200530.  
 
Africa is considered to have the largest concentration of fragile states. This is so 
because the post-colonial states in Africa adopted the critical features of their 
colonial masters. The colonial state exercised hegemony over the people, as well as 
controlled and managed the economy. In the same sense, the post-colonial states in 
Africa are viewed as having elite hegemony over the unlettered citizenry, state led 
developments, centralised authority, and sheer magnitudes of corruption31.  
 
Robert Bates, in his book “When things fell apart”, supports the aforementioned. 
According to him, the post independence African states have become authoritarian. 
The political elites have reconfigured African political institutions from multi-party 
to single party systems all in search of wealth and power. As a result, its citizens 
                                                     
29 Sekhar, C.S.C. (2010). Fragile States. Journal of Developing Societies (Sage Publications Inc.), 26(3), pp. 265. 
30 Hout, W. (2010). Between Development and Security: the European Union, governance and fragile states. Third World 
Quarterly, 31(1), pp. 143.  
31 Young Crawford, (2004). The end of Post- colonial state in Africa? Reflections on changing African political dynamics. 













view the state as a source of insecurity and threat rather than of well-being32. 
Therefore, according to Bates, authoritarianism laid the foundations for state 
failure. These features of post-colonial states in Africa mark the key characteristics 
of a fragile state. 
 
Cammack et al identify three types of groupings that can be used to differentiate 
the various definitions of ‘fragile states’33. These are State Functions, State Outputs 
and Relationships with donors. According to Cammack, the different definitions of 
state fragility attempted by various scholars can be fitted on any of the three 
groupings, while other definitions of the concept may overlap. 
 
State Functions refer to definitions that understand Fragile States in terms of lack 
of capacity or will to perform certain functions that contribute to the security and 
well-being of citizen’s of a country. State Outputs refers to definitions that see 
Fragile States as bringing about a host of problems including poverty, violent 
conflict, terrorism, organised crime, global security threats and epidemic diseases 
that cause difficulty in neighbouring countries. Relationship with donors refers to 
definitions that understand fragile States in terms of the difficult relationship they 
have with a particular donor or groups of donors34.  
 
According to OECD’s Development Assistance committee, “…a Fragile State is a 
State whose structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic 
functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security 
and human rights of their populations”35. This definition of fragile state falls 
                                                     
32 Bates, Robert. (2008). “When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in late Century Africa”. New York: Cambridge University 
Press 
33 Cammack, D, Mcleod, D, Rocha Menocal, A & Christiansen, K. (2006). Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda: A Survey of 
Current Thinking and Practice, Report Submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency, London: Overseas 
Development Institute, pp 16–18.  
34 Hout, W. (2010). Between Development and Security: the European Union, governance and fragile states. Third World 
Quarterly, 31(1), pp. 143. 
35 OECD. (2008).  Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC 














squarely on the first category of definitions describe by Cammack known as State 
Functions.  
 
In addition, Osaghae defines ‘fragile states’ as states that lack the capacity to 
discharge their normal functions and drive forward development. He further 
defines the characteristics of fragile states as “…weak, ineffective and unstable 
political institutions; inability to exercise effective jurisdiction over its territory; 
legitimacy crisis, contested citizenship, violent contestation of state power; unstable 
and divided population; underdeveloped institutions of conflict management and 
resolution; and pervasive corruption and poverty”36. This definition therefore fits 
perfectly on the second category- state outputs-identified by Cammack et al.  
 
More so, the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity 
(CRISE) define fragile states as “…States that are failing, or at risk of failing, with 
respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision or legitimacy”37. In this 
definition, a state is seen as fragile when it fails to provide protection of its citizens 
within its territory fails to provide the basic needs to its citizens and lacks the 
support of its citizens making it undemocratic.  
 
Therefore, it is important to note that a fragile state is not only a state that does not 
meet the basic needs of its citizenry, but also fails to provide authority within its 
territory and lacks the democratic support of its citizens. There are several states in 
developed countries that have failed to provide some of the basic needs to its 
citizens. However, these states are not fragile states since they still maintain 
authority within their territory, and command legitimate support from their 
citizenry.  
 
Fragile states are a threat to global peace, security and stability. According to 
World Bank Statistics, the number of states judged as fragile states by the World 
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Bank almost doubled from 14 in 2000 to 26 in 200638. According to a report 
published annually by the Foreign Policy Magazine and the fund for peace, Kenya 
ranked 16 in the failed state index for 201239. This report ranks all world countries 
using 12 indicators of ‘State Vulnerability’. Some of these variables include 
economic stability, human rights, refugee status, internally displaced persons and 
security. Mostly contributing to this high ranking is the security situation in Kenya, 
Poverty, and the poor quality of life, which are as a result of poor government 
policies, 2007-2008 post election violence, and corruption.  Poor government 
policies have led to the poor quality of life of the majority of Kenyans, especially 
those living in slum areas and low-income areas. Further, the post election violence 
on 2007 led to an increased number of internally displaced persons in the country, 
which further contributed to poverty and economic instability in the country.  
 
In this regard, Sekhar suggests that “…to rebuild capacity in highly fragile or failed 
states, priority should be accorded to addressing social vulnerability through 
immediate political measures, followed by long term initiative to promote 
economic development”40. This study concurs with this prescription of rebuilding a 
fragile state. This is so because, when addressing the social factors affecting a 
country, the government will have to revise its policies to ensure that they meet 
the needs of the citizens. On the other hand, to be able to promote economic 
development, the government will be required to organise its institutions 
effectively, as well as improve policies that relate to economic development. 
Therefore, state fragility is not only a problem of weak institutions, and failure to 
perform on the part of government, but also poor policies that do not meet the 
needs of the citizens.  
 
2.2.2 Historical Background on Fragile States 
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Colonialism is one of the major factors that led to the evolution of state fragility in 
most African states and the developing countries41.  
 
The state model adapted by most of the African postcolonial states was imported 
and imposed on the colonies by the colonial governments. However, failure to 
properly adapt to the ‘imported’ state structures by the colonies led to the 
separation between the state and the society; with the state exploiting rather than 
working together with the society42. As a result, political elites exploited their 
positions in search of resources to consume and to expend in pursuit of power. 
They channelled benefits to those whom they favoured, and offset the costs they 
inflicted upon those whose loyalty they sought to invest43 
 
In the colonial era, the natives viewed the colonial state as aggressive, enforcing its 
will through violence and repression, and placing emphasis on rudimentary laws 
and orders that ensured economic exploitation of the indigenous people44. They 
perceived the state as serving the interests of the colonisers at the expense of the 
indigenous people45. Therefore, in retaliation, the natives developed shadow state 
structures, mainly communal self-help organisations to fill the void left by state 
failure of the colonial state46. In the same way, in postcolonial states, the citizens 
view the leaders as a threat rather than a source of wellbeing47. Therefore, in 
retaliation, other alternative forces are filling in the void left by state failure of the 
postcolonial states. 
 
At independence, what happened was the changing of guard rather than the 
character of the state. Rather than distributing resources in a universalistic 
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manner, the elites in the post independence Africa now allocated resources more 
narrowly, retaining a greater portion for themselves48. The independent African 
states were not properly institutionalised, therefore importing fragile state 
variables from colonial states.  
 
2.2.3 Theories on Fragile States 
A number of theories have emerged to explain the political disorder and decay that 
eventually led to fragile states. These include the Dependency Theory of 1960’s-
also known as the Neo-Marxist dependency theory; the Neo-Liberalism theory; and 
the Neo-Patrimonial theory of the 1980’s.  
 
The Neo-Marxist Dependency Theory  
This theory attributes state fragility to the economic crisis of the 1960’s. It is a 
theory of how developed and developing countries int ract.  
 
The dependency theory was developed in the late 1950’s and became popular in 
the 1960’s. It developed when Raul Prebisch49 and his colleagues were troubled 
that the economic growth in the advanced industrialised nations did not 
necessarily lead to growth in the poorer nations as was assumed by the neo-
classical theory50. Therefore, the dependency theory was used to explain the 
persistent poverty of the poorer nations.  
 
The theory holds that there are a number of established nations that are 
continuously fed by developing nations at the expense of the developing nations 
own health51. The developing countries export primary commodities to the 
developed countries, which then manufacture the products and sell them back to 
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the developing countries52. Therefore, there is no “Value Addition” for the 
developing nations, as they never earn enough from their exports to pay for their 
imports. This therefore leads to an economic crisis.  
 
Marxist dependency theory viewed the persistent poverty and fragility of 
developing nations as a consequence of this capitalist exploitation. Therefore, the 
theory suggests that to rebuild the fragile states, the developing countries should 
de-link their economies from the global system and adapt a state controlled 
development strategy53. That is, developing countries should embark in programs 
of import substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured products 
from the developed countries54. They should however still sell their primary 
products to the developed countries.  
 
The Neo-Liberalism Theory 
This theory attributes state fragility to the interventionist nature of the welfare 
state, government subsidies, and poor allocation of resources by the state55.  
 
According to this theory, the state becomes fragile when it is involved in the 
provision of the entire basic social services to its citizens e.g. education, water, 
electricity and sanitation services. Most of the government resources are directed 
to the provision of these services. However, as the population continues to 
increase, government service provision begins to decrease. The government is 
then unable to meet the needs of all the population in the country due to poor 
management and financial capacity. This therefore leads to economic crisis, where 
the government expenditure is more than the revenue. As a result, the state seeks 
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assistance from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an attempt to combat the economic crisis.  
 
However, these loans from international financial institutions have conditions 
attached to them, requiring the developing countries to adopt a set of policy 
conditions advocated by the Washington consensus. The conditions include inter 
alia: “…Cutting public expenditure for social services, Deregulating capital markets 
and domestic economies, privatisation of state-owned industries and utilities and 
eliminating and lowering tariffs”56.  
 
It is these conditions of the international financial institutions that have led to the 
increase in privatisation of sectors previously run and regulated by the state. 
However, the absence of clear private property rights is seen as one of the greatest 
institutional barriers of economic development and improvement of human 
welfare57. Failure to enclose and assign private property rights eventually leads to 
the tragedy of the commons (the tendency of individuals to super-exploit common 
property resources such as land and water). 58 Therefore, this creates gaps in the 
market system in which private “though illegal” providers such as the militias also 
step in. 
 
This theory prescribes that to rebuild fragile states; governments need to move 
away from a welfare state by contracting out some of its social services to private 
industries and service providers. In doing so, the government needs to enclose and 
provide private property rights to protect against the so-called “tragedy of the 
commons” and the eventual rise of illegal private service providers.  
 
The Neo-Patrimonial Theory 
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This theory links state fragility to the patrimonialistic nature of the state. This 
involves redistributing resources as favours to followers that respond with loyalty 
to leaders59.   
 
Neo-Patrimonialism denotes a system where patrons- in this case the elites in 
government, use state resources in order to keep the loyalty of their clients in the 
population. Most African states have become authoritarian in that, rather than 
distributing benefits in a universalistic manner where all population benefits, the 
elites now allocate these benefits narrowly, thereby retaining a greater portion for 
themselves.60 As a result, the citizens increasingly view their leaders as a source of 
insecurity, and the state as a source of threat rather than of well-being61. 
Therefore, this patrimonial nature of state elites is what laid the foundation for 
state failure. 
 
Due to this unequal distribution of resources to the citizens by the political elites, 
human insecurity has increased thus leading to state failure.  Human security is 
about creating conducive environment for individuals to live in ‘freedom from 
want’ and ‘freedom to’. ‘Freedom from want refers to the absence or protection 
from hunger, natural disaster, tor ure and so on. While ‘freedom to’ refers to the 
opportunities that individuals should have to develop their potential as much as 
possible and to enjoy life to the fullest62. However, with Neo-Patrimonialism, most 
citizens are denied the access, protection and empowerment to the material or 
quantitative dimensions of human existence such as food, shelter, clothing, 
education and health care63. Further, the citizens lack access to non-material or 
qualitative conditions of human existence, such as freedom, liberty and 
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participation in the decisions of the community that affect their lives64. This 
therefore leads to state fragility. 
 
2.2.4 Policy Making on Fragile States 
Different scholars and practitioners have identified numerous drivers of state 
fragility for example: poverty, economic stagnation, authoritarian rule, oppression 
of ethnic minorities, unequal access to services, unemployment, and political 
contestation. Most of these concerns relate to the state and society, and are 
therefore connected to policy, and how the society is governed by government 
policies65.  
 
An analysis done and published by Centre for Research on Inequality, Human 
Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) in June 2010, aims at making the concept of ‘fragile 
states’ operational for development policy66. In this analysis, CRISE propose a 
three-pronged definition of fragile states as “…States that are failing, or at risk of 
failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision and 
legitimacy”67.   
 
Therefore, authority failure means a state lacks the authority to protect its 
citizens from violence of various kinds. This means the state is not providing 
adequate security to its citizens. Service failure means a state fails to ensure all 
citizens have access to basic services. More so, legitimacy failure means the state 
enjoys only limited support among the people and it is typically not democratic. All 
these dimensions that define state fragility have a causal relationship as shown in 
the figure below. 
 
Figure 1: Causal Relationship between the three dimensions of Fragility 
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   Causal links 




(Source:Stewart, F. And Brown, G. 2010. (ed.3). Fragile States. London: CRISE) 
 
As illustrated above, authority failure is associated with service delivery failure 
and vis versa. Therefore, lack of authority, that is, failure by government to provide 
adequate security to its citizens makes it difficult to deliver services effectively. 
More so, service delivery failures on the other hand are associated with conflict 
and loss of authority.  
 
In addition, legitimacy failures are mainly associated with poor service delivery 
and lack of authority.68 When the state fails to provide basic services to its citizens 
and to ensure their security within the territory, it will most likely than not fail to 
receive support from its citizens. In the same manner, when there is no support 
from the citizens, it is difficult for the state to exercise authority and protect its 
citizens from violence. Therefore, all the three components are associated with 
each other. Meaning that failure to perform one of the dimensions of fragility by 
the state will possibly lead to failure in the other two dimensions.  
 
Therefore, this confirms the fact that state fragility is not only about a state that 
does not meet the basic needs of its citizenry, but also fails to provide authority 
within its territory and lacks the democratic support of its citizens. This eventually 
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creates a gap in the society that other alternative forces emerge to fill in, in place of 
the government. 
 
From a policy perspective, it is important to note that most state policies are 
differentiated alongside the three dimensions of fragility identified above. There 
are policies that deal with issues of service delivery to the citizens such as basic 
health and education, other policies deal with protection of the citizens within the 
countries territory, and others deal with promoting democracy and participatory 
governance.  
 
Therefore, failure of either of these policies means that the state is at risk of failing. 
In this case, a state needs to identify from which direction state failure is occurring 
and why the failure came about. That is, identify which policies are responsible for 
which particular direction or dimension of failure. Once the policies are identified 
and corrected, the underlying causes of state failure may be prevented. A good 
policy is one that tackles the underlying causes of failure to prevent a recurrence 
or breakdown. 
 
Risk Factors Associated with Authority, Service and Legitimacy Failure 
Analysing the three dimensions of fragility, we can identify some risk factors 
associated with each dimension. Risk factors that may lead to authority failure 
include socio-economic inequalities, political inequalities, low incomes, lack of 
employment opportunities and weak security apparatus.  
 
Similarly, the risk factors that may lead to service failure include poor revenue 
potential, lack of technical and administrative capacity, unwillingness of 
government to meet the needs of certain groups, and unwillingness of government 
to introduce adequate taxes69. Potential reasons for legitimacy failure include 
military domination, absence of democratic structures, government control of 
press, high level of corruption, among other factors.   
                                                     














Therefore, analysing these risk factors shows that poor government policies are a 
key contributor to state fragility. A fragile state therefore needs to constantly 
review and revise its policies to ensure that the needs of its citizenry are being met, 
there is adequate security within its borders, and democracy is being exercised.  
Failure to do so keeps a state at a risk of failing and eventually loosing its 
legitimacy. Stewart and Brown clearly state that:  
 
“…A major issue with respect to policies towards state failure is that frequently it is 
the government itself that is responsible for these failures; in such cases, failure is the 
intended, not the unintended, consequence of government policy”70.  
 
This means that when governments do not constantly review and revise their 
policies to adapt to the changing times and also to ensure their effectiveness in 
meeting the needs of all citizenry, then failure as a result of these policies becomes 
an intended consequence of government actions. 
 
2.3 Background on Militia Groups  
2.3.1 Definition of Militia Groups 
A review of literature on militia reveals a wealth of information about militia 
organization structures and the purpose or objectives of militias. However, there 
are little attempts in these scholarly materials to define the movement. When the 
definition is provided, it is usually narrowly focused. For example, Freilich et al 
define the modern militia movement as “…a group of loosely affiliated 
organizations without central leadership”71. According to them, the militias are 
committed to a set of core beliefs aimed at protecting citizen’s rights from 
perceived threats.  
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Similarly, Okumu and Ikelegbe define militia groups as “…a civil force or privately 
organized group of armed person, whose structures, hierarchy, command, procedures 
and processes are usually not fixed and rigid; and are generally mobilized voluntarily 
on the basis of some common identity challenges, general concerns and threats”72. 
According to Okumu et al, the purpose or goals of militias usually relate to 
protecting, fighting for and defending citizens ethnic, religious, sectional, regional 
or related interests that may concern power, security and safety73. 
 
More so, Schultz, et al in their definition of militia provides a starting point for the 
study of militia by defining them according to a set of descriptive characteristics:  
“…A militia in today’s context is a recognizable irregular armed force operating 
within the territory of a weak and/or failing state. The members of militias often 
come from the under classes and tend to be composed of young males who are drawn 
into this milieu because it gives them access to money, resources, power, and security. 
Not infrequently they are forced to join; in other instances it is seen as an opportunity 
or a duty. Militias can represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other 
communal groups. They may operate under the auspices of a factional leader, clan, or 
ethnic group, or on their own after the break-up of the states’ forces. They may also 
be in the service of the state, either directly or indirectly. Generally, members of 
militias receive no formal military training. Nevertheless, in some cases they are 
skilled unconventional fighters. In other instances they are nothing more than a gang 
of extremely violent thugs that prey on the civilian population”74. 
 
Based on the characteristics of militias presented above, it is possible to classify 
militia groups into multiple categories and label them in a number of different 
ways. While some Militia groups may be labeled ‘Rebel Groups’ in the case of 
Eastern Congo, typifying their agenda and recognizing them as threats to security; 
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their counter parts, in Kenya, may be referred to as ‘gangs’ implying lack of a 
system and structure in their agenda75. 
 
Therefore, the above definitions of militias provide a baseline by which we can 
attempt to classify different militia groups.  
 
                                                     














2.3.2 Types of Militia Groups 
Different types of militia groups exist as has been demonstrated in the definitions 
above. They are differentiated by their functions, objectives, origin, and purpose of 
their existence. There is no universal classification of militia groups. However, the 
most common classification used for militias is state militants and non-state 
militants. All other categories fall as sub-categories of these two main 
classifications.  
 
2.3.2.1 State Militants 
State Militants are “…paramilitary formations that organize in defense of the 
political order, and proxies set up as adjuncts of state power”76. These militias fight 
for, or on behalf of the state or state functionaries77. They may be called upon by 
the state to perform occasional duties of defending the state interests.  
 
The state militants are sub-divided into three sub-categories. These are the quasi 
military, the government militias, and the state patronized militias78. The quasi 
military are a reserve military force with occasional duties established for a 
particular purpose such as disasters, internal conflicts and wars79. However, they 
are not part of the regular army organization. 
 
The government militias are a civil armed group constituted by government to 
provide defense, emergency law enforcement, paramilitary service, or combat 
certain threats and security issues in times of emergency without being committed 
to a fixed term of service. The state patronized militias are tied to a particular 
political regime.80 They are formed to serve the agenda and interests of the regime 
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in power at the time of its reign. However, when there is a regime change, this 
militia group ceases to exist. 
2.3.2.2 Non-State Militants 
Non-State Militants are ‘privately’ organized armed groups. They are without 
standard military unit organization. This means that they are not part of the 
regular army of the state. They are composed of ordinary citizens who organize 
themselves to combat certain threats and security issues. They have no regular 
salary, or a fixed term of service. 
 
Non-state militants are recruited from local areas, communities and provinces, and 
are more often engaged in sectional and primordial causes.  They represent 
specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other communal groups, and are mostly 
composed of young males from under classes. They take the form of political, 
community, ethnic, religious, vigilantes, warlords and youth militias’.81 
 
Political militias are those militias that struggle for political domination. They fight 
an insurgency against a particular regime in favor of their preferred political 
candidate. Their activities are mostly political violence, racketeering, terrorism and 
kidnappings. They include the likes of the Ninjas in the Republic of Congo. This 
particular group of militias participated in numerous wars and insurgencies in the 
1990’s and 2000’s.  
 
The community/ethnic militias are youth based groups formed with the purpose 
supporting a cause aligned with ethnic interests. Their objective is to promote and 
protect the parochial interests of their ethnic groups. They provide security for 
their communities; fight for inclusion, resources and justice for their communities; 
and prevent crime in the community. 
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Further, these ethnic militia groups can take the form of marketised militias82. 
Meaning, they form a kind of “bandit economy” within their ethnic communities to 
provide for the economic needs of their community such as employment and 
provision of basic services such as electricity and water. This category of militia 
includes the Mungiki in Kenya, Interahamwe in Rwanda, Egbesu/Oduduwa 
People’s Congress in Nigeria, among others.  
 
The vigilantes, warlords and youth militias are the non-state militias that fight for 
identity, resource access, security crime control and power. An example is the 
Bakassi boys in Nigeria. The table below represents this classification of militia as 
state or non-state militant groups.  
 
Table 1: Typology of Militias in Africa  
 TYPES GOALS CASES 
STATE MILITIAS Reserve army  Compliment State Military National Guard (Nigeria) 
Government supported or 
patronized 
Counter insurgency Popular Defence Force / 
Janjaweed (Sudan) Kamajor 
(Sierra Leone) Fifth Brigade 
(Zimbabwe) Arrow Group 




Political militias Political Objectives-struggle 
for political domination 
Mambas, Cobras and Ninjas 
(RoC) 
Community/ethnic Militias Identity Rights Struggle for 
inclusion, Resource and 
Justice 
Egbesu/Oduduwa People’s 
Congress (Nigeria) Mungiki 
(Kenya) Militias under 
Southern Defence Force 
(Sudan) 
Interahamwe (Rwanda) 
Youth militias Identity resource access 
insurgency 
Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
/ Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (Nigeria) 
Vigilantes Militias Security crime control Bakassi Boys (Nigeria) 
Warlords Militias Struggle for power and 
resources 
Commercial violence 
Armed bands and cult 
groups in the Niger Delta 
(Nigeria) 
 
                                                     













(Source: Source: Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (2010). Militias, Rebels and Islamists Militants: 















In Kenya, most of the militia groups that exist fall under the category of non-state 
militants. They are mostly ethnically oriented and seek to protect the interests of 
their own communities. Usually, they do so in response to government failure to 
provide basic services to the community such as clean water, electricity, 
sanitation, health facilities, employment opportunities, security and education.  
 
However, some militia groups may be composed as non-state militants but 
sometimes work with the state to promote state interests. An example is the 
Mungiki in Kenya. During, the elections in 2007, they were hired by some 
politicians to rally support from the Kikuyu community. In other occasions, the 
government hunts them down because they are a threat to the citizen’s security. 
In this case, it would be useful to add a third classification of militias known as 
“pseudo militias” to represent this category of militias. Pseudo militias can be 
defined as militias that are essentially non-state militants, but are occasionally 
hired by the state elites to promote their political interests.83 
 
2.3.3 Causes for Proliferation of Militia Groups 
Several explanatory perspectives on militia can be used to decipher their 
proliferation and sustenance. There is usually a direct correlation between 
poverty and militia membership as well as between wealth and the proliferation 
of militia gangs. This means that when a small proportion of the population 
controls wealth, then civil disorder and gangs are likely to emerge. This is the 
case in South America and the developing countries.  
 
Further, most militia members are not born bad, but are victims of the 
environment they live in. Most of them grow up in impoverished environments 
with lack of education, unemployment and no way out for them. Therefore, they 
end up, as a natural human reaction, grouping together for survival.  
 
                                                     













Therefore, it is imperative to note that, different militias form for different 
reasons, as the next section of this study shall explain. 
 
2.3.3.1 State Militants 
This study has shown that not all militia groups operate as insurgents against the 
state. Those militia groups organised in defence of a political order, or fight on 
behalf of the state and state functionalities are known as the state militants84. 
The reason for their proliferation is essentially state centric. The state usually 
demands for their services especially in times of emergency. They are different 
from the police force in that, the police are involved in the day to day 
maintenance of law and order, preservation of peace, protection of life and 
property, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders, and the 
enforcement of all the laws and regulations with which the force is charged85. 
 
Usually, the state militants are tied to a particular regime and may be 
remunerated and equipped with public funds. The state makes use of them based 
on utility and expedience86. For instance, they maybe reserved for occasional 
duties established for a particular purpose such as disasters, internal conflicts 
and wars. The government discreetly funds, equips and protects them for the 
purpose of crime control and counter insurgency87.  
 
An example is the Janjaweed militias in Sudan. The government has used them to 
fight rebel groups in the Darfur region. Similarly, in Cote d’ Ivoire, the Congrès 
Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes (COJEP), commonly known as young 
patriots are used by government to target northerners, immigrants and the 
French88. 
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2.3.3.2 Non-State Militants 
There are several explanatory perspectives for the proliferation of non-state 
militants. These may be political, social or economic reasons. Politically, they 
form to fight for inclusion in the political system as well as for justice. Socially, 
they fight for equality in the distribution of public resources by government, 
especially to the poor community. Economically, they fight for education and job 
opportunities to improve the living conditions of the poor in the community.  
 
To emphasize the aforementioned, Ngunyi et al offer three explanations 
regarding non-state militia proliferation.  
 
The first relates to space. In this study, space refers to the governance space. Re-
organised spaces like slums create opportunities that naturally attract crime, 
thus resulting is some form of decay. According to this theory, the further the 
slums are from the centre of control, which is the government, the greater their 
distance decay in terms of control and interaction89. Therefore, this means that 
the social spaces that are not administered by the state due to their distance 
from the central control are breeding ground for private violence, leading to the 
rise of militia groups to fill in the spaces. However, distance is not the only factor 
that causes decay, other factors include relationships, economic exclusions, and 
distance between the poor and the law. All these offer a good breeding ground 
for crime and violence.  
 
An example of a non-state militia groups that emerged due to space issue is the 
Mara Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS 13 in El Salvador. This dangerous 
gang started in the 1980’s in Los-Angeles by Salvadorian immigrants to the 
United States running away from the civil conflict in El Salvador. They formed 
the gangs to protect themselves from racial violence and attacks by other 
gangs90. However, when they travelled back to El Salvador, their government 
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failed to resettle them and to integrate them back to the community91. More so, 
the government failed to protect them, and to provide programs that they can 
actively be involved in to earn a living92. As a result, the returning immigrants 
ended up settling in slum areas and they formed gangs to protect themselves 
from rivalry gangs that they found in El Salvador, as well as to provide food for 
their families. 
 
Similarly in Belize, a country known as home to multi-dollar businesses involved 
in Cocaine smuggling. The Colombians use local gangs such as the Sicario, to 
smuggle drugs through Belize by sea to the Mexican Local Cartels93. This 
happens mainly because of economic exclusions of majority living in the slum 
areas. There are approximately 23 gangs in Belize and over 3,000 gangsters94. 
These gangs live in the poorest areas ignored by the government. They sell crack 
cocaine and Marijuana to earn a living and support their families as the 
government has failed to provide welfare services in rural areas. 
 
J.Q. Wilson and G. Kelling’s Broken Window thesis affirms the foregoing95. 
According to them, crime and disorder are rooted in decaying neighbourhood.  
Their position is that the situation of societal neglect feeds crime.  In other 
words, emergence of armed groups is much the consequence of societal neglect.  
Disorder, they note, has to be contained before it spreads out96. Yet merely 
concentrating on their spaces of retreat cannot capture the type of crime, 
especially the emergence of armed groups.  More so because they have multiple 
centres of gravity that have to be identified, located isolated and destroyed. Of 
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equal importance is that these spaces could be located amongst the political 
class. This implies that location is not an end in itself97. 
 
The second explanation for non-state militia proliferation focuses on 
governance. The central issue is that a ‘too small’ government force is policing 
far too many spaces thereby causing an imbalance. As a result, those distance 
spaces close up limiting the influence of the government on their activities. 
Therefore, alternative forces such as the militia rise up to police them and 
increase their legitimacy in the community. A symbiosis between the ‘supply’ of 
criminal activities and its ‘demand’ by community begins to emerge98. The 
further away the state is from the closed spaces, the higher the legitimacy of 
gangs as the ‘alternative state’. And this is how the militias emerge.  
 
A good example of militia proliferation due to governance issues is in Colombia; 
a city torn apart in the most barbaric civil wars in modern history. Colombia is 
home to another gang known as the Sicario. For the last four decades the 
Colombia government has been fighting the Left Wing Guerrillas. Since the 
1980’s the government troops were supported by an illegal group of 
paramilitary army99. This gave birth to its very own breed of killers known as the 
Sicario who are trained to kill without mercy100. Since 2003 the Colombia 
government tried to demobilize most of the Para-military members and initiated 
a school program to integrate the Para-militaries back to civil life101. However, 
despite the demobilization, there are still some paramilitaries continuing to 
recruit from other local gangs, and therefore, Sicario continues to exist. The 
reason for their existence is their lack of faith and confidence in the Colombia 
government102. The Sicario do not agree with the justice system in Colombia, 
because most offenders are usually released and continue with crime in the 
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communities. Therefore, their aim is to kill and bring justice in the community. 
They protect the community from people who take advantage of them for money 
through social cleansing. 
 
The third explanation on proliferation of non-state militias is anchored in the 
classical theory of crime, a variant of the classical school of criminology.103 Its 
emphasis is on reason noting that people exercise their free will and are thus 
responsible for their actions104. This means that actions are weighted on the 
potential pleasure derived as well as the associated pain. Therefore, crime is 
committed out of rationalised calculation of value of expected returns. In other 
words, groups that commit acts deemed criminal are driven by a calculated 
expected value return. The inclination is bound to increase to the extent that the 
variable of capture and punishment is lesser or not costly compared to non-
action. 
 
An example of a gang that operates by virtue of reason, so as to get a valued 
return is in Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, people turn to criminality due to high levels of 
unemployment and poverty. In 2007, Bulgaria joined the European Union, but 18 
months later, the EU had to take drastic measures and withdrew its support due 
to corruption and organised crimes. Most gangs in Bulgaria are involved in pick 
pocketing, prostitution, credit card frauds, human trafficking among other 
crimes105. However, the most popular crime is pick pocketing especially in the 
UK. The gang operating in the UK makes approximately 200 million pounds 
every year from pick pocketing.  
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter of the study has introduced the concept, theories and historical 
background of state fragility. Further, this chapter has looked at the different 
types of militias and the reason for their proliferation. The aim of having this 
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background on state fragility and militia proliferation is to determine whether 
the emergence of alternative forces such as the militia groups is a function of 
state policy failure.  
 
From the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that when the state policies fail in the 
areas of service delivery to its citizens, authority- that is; provision of security 
within its territory, and legitimacy; whereby the state has adequate support from 
its citizens, then a gap is created and alternative forces emerge to fill in this gap. 
 
Alternative forces such as the militia groups emerge due to the ‘space’ that exists 
between the government and the community. This space is created due to 
government absence in its provisioning capacity. An example is the gangs that 
emerged in El Salvador and Belize to fill in this space in their countries by 
providing services that their governments have failed to provide for the 
community.  
 
Further, due to poor governance whereby, a small government force is policing 
far too many spaces thereby causing an imbalance, alternative forces emerge. 
These alternative forces, in the form of militias, emerge to police the distance 
spaces that have closed up limiting the influence of government on their 
activities. This increases the militia legitimacy in the community, while reducing 
that of government. Lastly, militia groups and other alternative forces also 
emerge due to the expected returns they derive from their actions in their 
community.  
 
Therefore, to reduce this ‘gap’ created by poor state policies, and that leads to 
the emergence of these alternative forces, the governments need to review and 
revise their policies to ensure that they adapt to the changing realities, and meet 
the needs of the citizens. These policies need to constantly be reviewed and 
revised to ensure that the gap between the centre of control and the community 
is always at its minimal, and also to ensure that there is a balance between the 
government forces deployed to govern a particular space, and the space they are 




























3. POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE OF KENYA 
 
This chapter of the study looks at the general background of the political and 
government structure in Kenya. It will give a background to the next chapter’s 
exploration of whether there are legislative, policy and administrative failures 
that have led to the proliferation of militia groups in Kenya. We will also look at a 
brief political history of Kenya to investigate if militia proliferation and activities 
have their genesis in Kenya’s political past. 
 
3.1  Geographic location and Population Composition 
The Republic of Kenya is a country in East Africa that lies on the Equator. It is 
bordered to the South by Tanzania, Uganda to the West, Ethiopia and South 
Sudan to the North, Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the East. Kenya is a former 
British colony and covers a landmass area of 580’000 km2 with a population of 

























Figure 2: Map of Kenya 
      
 
The population is composed of about 42 ethnic groups speaking different 
languages from the Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic linguistic groups. The major 
ethnic groups include the Kikuyu (6 Million), Luhya (5Million), Luo (5 Million), 
Kalenjin (4 Million), Kamba (3.9 Million), Kisii (2.2 Million) and the Mijikenda 
(1.1 million)106. However, English, is spoken as the official language, while 
Kiswahili, stands as the national language. The majority of Kenyans profess to be 
Christians (82%) while a good number of minorities exist; Muslims (11%), 
Traditional African Religions (5%), irreligious (2%) and Hindus 1%107. Most of 
the Muslim population is to be found in the coastal regions while the rest of the 
country is largely Christian. 
 
Figure 3: Population of Kenya 
             
                                                     














3.2 History  
3.2.1 Pre history 
The area that is now known as Kenya was historically stateless. Its inhabitant’s 
civility and ethnicity was shaped by their subsistence: herding, farming or both. 
Ethnic economies were often complimentary with different specialization108. In 
an environment of under population and a lack of a centralized power tribal 
rivalry could not be sustained. The different ethnic groups therefore co-existed 
in relative peace and harmony. It was European rivalry that introduced the 
concept of a state government to Kenya and the African continent.  
 
3.2.2 Colonization 
In 1884, behind closed doors at the Berlin conference, European powers met 
and decided the fate of the African continent. No African leaders were invited 
or consulted. In 1888 Sire William Mackinnon received a royal charter and 
concessionary rights to develop trade in the East Africa Coast under the aegis of 
the British East African Company (BEAC). In 1895 BEAC ran it financial 
difficulties and the British Government stepped in to establish formal control of 
the region through the East African Protectorate109. This was largely confined 
to the coastal region due to the difficult terrain and hostile tribes of the 
hinterland. However the building of the Kenya-Uganda railway opened up the 
interior to British settlers who eventually moved their administrative capital 
from Mombasa to Nairobi. The colonization process was well underway and it 
eventually saw an upsurge in European settlers from a mere 9000 in 1920 to 
80000 in the 1950s. Kenya was transformed into a crown colony in 1920 after 
much lobbying from white settlers and a legislative Council was established but 
no Africans were allowed any political involvement or participation. 
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White settlers and white war veterans were offered subsidised land in the 
highlands around Nairobi. They owned about 20% of Kenya’s rich farmland 
while they encouraged indigenous communities to farm on the other 80% to 
add to the state revenue110. Therefore by default the second economic hub 
became the kikuyu-land and the kikuyus’ were under the greatest pressure 
from white settlers111. Political activism and by extension the anti-colonial 
movement resulted in this region under the leadership of such people as Harry 
Thuku and Jomo Kenyatta (Then Johnstone Kamau). The MauMau, a secret, 
violent offshoot of this union was born out of this anti-colonial movement112. 
Their aim was to drive out the white farmers, reclaim and occupy these farms. 
 
3.2.3 Independence 
After WWII, small guerrilla outfits began to attack and intimidate white settlers 
in Kenya and anyone that seemed to collaborate with them. After about four 
years of intense military operations the various MauMau units came together 
and the umbrella of Kenya Land Freedom Army led by Field marshal Dedan 
Kimathi113. Worthy to note here is that the Mungiki, covered extensively in 
another section of this thesis refer to themselves as a thuna cia Maumau 
(MauMau offshoots)114. The war for independence then began in earnest and 
resulted in the British declaring a state of emergency in 1952. By 1956 the war 
had been quelled but the struggle for independence continued. The British 
finally transferred power to a democratically elected government in 1963. It 
also offered financial support to buy off white settlers in the form of loans and 
grants and restore local tribes to their homelands115. On 12 December 1964 the 
Republic of Kenya was proclaimed, and Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya's first 
president. 
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3.3 The Kenya Government: Structure and Functions 
The 2010 Kenyan constitution was promulgated on the 27th of August 2010 and 
replaced the old constitution of 1969 that replaced the independence constitution. 
The 1963 independence constitution was inherited from the British Lancaster 
House template used by former British colonies. Under this constitution the British 
monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, was represented as head of state by a Governor-
General of Kenya. The Constitution also provided for a bicameral parliament, 
the National Assembly, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
Each province had an elected assembly116. 
In 1964, the Constitution was amended to make the country a republic with 
the President as both head of state and head of government, and in 1966, the 
membership of the Senate and House of Representatives was combined to form 
a unicameral National Assembly117. 
3.3.1 Structure of Government 
 1969 Constitution        
In 1969, the independence constitution was replaced with a new one that 
entrenched changes already made to the system of government inherited at 
independence. The new constitution changed the structure of the state from 
a federal, or Majimbo system, to a unitary system; creating a unicameral 
instead of bicameral legislature; changing from a parliamentary to a semi-
presidential system with a powerful presidency; and reducing the 
protections of the bill of rights118. 
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The constitution created three arms of government, namely, the executive, 
the legislature and the judiciary, each of which has its specific function 
contributing to the check and balances of operation119. 
Under the 1969 constitution, the administrative sub-divisions of the 
government included 47 legal districts, joined to form eight provinces. 
These include Nairobi province, Rift-Valley province, Central province, 
Nyanza province, Western province, Eastern province, Northeastern 
province and the Coastal province.  
 
Further, the local government was divided into four categories: City Council, 
Municipal Council, County Councils and Town Councils. There were 175 local 
authorities in total, One city council, which is Nairobi, 45 Municipal 
councils, 67 county councils and 62 town councils120. The powers of 
establishing a county, municipal and councils were vested in the minister of 
Local Government. The local authorities were run in a committee-based 
system. Each local authority had a decision making (political) structure, 
headed by the Mayor and the administrative structure headed by a town or 
county clerk. The Local authorities’ functions were divided into two by the 
Local Government Act. One is the Mandatory function, which involves 
functions that the local authorities must do under the law, example: 
Provision of burial sites. Two is the permissive function, which involves 
functions that the local authority may exercise at their own instance, and 
those that they may perform subject to the approval of the minister or 
subject to compliance with the law. 
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Kenya Constitution (2010)        
 Following the adoption of the new constitution in 2010, the structure and 
 functions of the three arms of government slightly changed. Key changes 
 in the  new constitution include:  
1. Separation of Powers between the Three arms of government i.e. 
Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. 
2. The Executive: who holds executive authority and their qualification. 
3. The Legislature: the composition, and representation of the people. 
An introduction of an upper house - the Senate  
4. Devolution - only two levels of Government: National and Counties.  
 
The executive arm of government still remains composed of the 
president, the deputy president and the cabinet.  The president is the 
head of state and of government. However, he/she is not a member of 
parliament as it was in the previous constitution. As the head of 
government, the president yields executive authority, coordinates and 
supervises all major sections of the executive branch.  
 
The legislature as expressed in the new constitution of 2010 will 
constitute the following:  
I. An upper house, which is the Senate; each of the 47 counties will 
have a senator who is elected by the electorate121. According to 
article 145 of the 2010 constitution, the Senate will preside over 
presidential impeachment hearings 
II. A Lower house, which is the National Assembly; Each of the 290 
constituencies will have an elected member of parliament. In 
addition there will be some nominated members in the national 
assembly and a women representative elected by each of the 
                                                     












county assemblies, guaranteeing a minimum of 47 women MPs in 
the national assembly122. 
III. The County Assemblies and Executives; each of the new 47 
counties established under the new constitution will have a 
county executive headed by a county Governor elected by the 
people and A county assembly elected with representatives from 
wards within the county123. 
The judiciary under the new constitution has three superior courts: The 
Supreme Court, which is the highest judiciary organ consisting of the 
Chief justice and his deputy and five other judges. It handles appeals 
from constitutional courts and will preside over presidential 
impeachment proceedings. Secondly, the Court of Appeal will handle the 
appeal cases from the High Court and as prescribed by parliament. It 
will constitute not less than 12 judges.  Lastly, the High Court which is 
the superior court of records that has unlimited original jurisdiction in 
civil and criminal matters 124. 
 3.4 The Constitution of Kenya on ‘Rights’ of citizens, and 
Militia  Proliferation 
3.4.1 Prevention of Organized Crime Act 
The Prevention of Organized Crime Act, Cap 6 of 2010 constitution, is the 
principal legislation on organised crime in Kenya. However, there are 
different Acts of Parliament that deal with the proliferation of organised 
crime125 they are: the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Act, the Firearms Act, 
and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act.  
 
This piece of legislature defines a, “militia criminal group126” as “a 
structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
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acting in concert with the aim of - (a) committing one or more serious 
crimes […]”. Their introduction also includes consistent definitions of 
“serious crime” and “structured group.” According to the Prevention of 
Organized Crime Act, Cap 6 of 2010, a person engages in criminal activities 
when they are directly involved in the crime, advices an organised criminal 
group, works with a criminal group for material gains and purposes, 
provides leadership to a criminal group, assists any criminal group, or 
engages in any kind of business or investment on behalf of a criminal group. 
Therefore, a person is said to be in a criminal gang whether he is directly or 
indirectly involved with the gang.  
It is of note that legislation does not guarantee its own effective application 
or implementation, therefore leading to policy failure.  
 
3.4.2 The bill of Rights 
The Bill of Rights enshrined in the Kenyan Constitution accords certain 
fundamental rights to its citizens, and outlines the responsibility of the 
Kenyan government to protect and respect these rights. The Constitution 
defines the extent and circumstances under which certain rights may be 
restricted by the government. Ultimately, rather than outlining how the 
government should deal with criminality, it serves to protect Kenyan 
citizens from unjustified and illegitimate “crack-downs” by government 
forces in their efforts to do so.  
 
Thus, while the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act 2010 defines the 
response of the State to organized criminality, the Kenyan Bill of Rights 
places restrictions on the behaviour of the government and outlines its 
obligation to ensure the safety of its citizens. In essence, the first piece of 
legislation targets the behaviour of criminal gangs, while the second—the 














3.4.3 Failure to Realise the Bill of Rights and Prevention of Organized 
Crime 
It is important to understand the exact content and provisions of Kenya’s 
existing legal framework for dealing with organized crime. This is in light of 
the many serious accusations against the Kenyan police and security forces 
for their failure to protect the citizens against security threats and their 
massive violations of human rights in Kenya’s “war on crime.” 
 
It is important also to understand the extent to which these failures and 
violations could be allowed by gaps in the legislation—for example, by 
providing such a vague definition of criminality and criminal groups so as to 
“justify” the massive restriction of fundamental rights of citizens that has 
taken place, versus an error in the application or enforcement of these 
policies by the security authorities.   
 
Furthermore, as the Bill of Rights and the Kenyan Constitution make clear, 
Kenyan civilians have a right to a certain extent of security and protection. 
In the event that the Kenyan security forces are unable to provide this, 
citizens may more or less seek protection from alternate security providers 
as well as the militias—an indicator of the so-called “gap hypothesis” of 
militia formation and proliferation. When militia groups begin to proliferate 
and provide services that the government ought to be providing to its 
citizens, then it is an indicator of a weak legislative system.  Therefore, in 
Kenya, the existence of militia groups especially in low-income areas such 
as slums is clear evidence that the system of government in these areas is 
weak. There are ‘gaps’ that exist in legislation and in practice that allow for 













3.5 Proliferation of Militia in Kenya: State Policy Frameworks 
Section 239 (1) of the Constitution outlines the three organs of the Kenyan 
national security system: the Kenya Defence Forces, the National 
Intelligence Service, and the National Police Service. These forces are 
explicitly prohibited from acting in a partisan manner or furthering in any 
way the interests of political parties [239 (3) a-c]. The Constitution also 
forbids the formation of any military or paramilitary organizations that 
operate parallel to the state in providing security [239 (4)]. In fact, the 
constitutionally described responsibilities of these security organs require 
and allow them to lead the fight against organized crime and militias in 
Kenya.  
 
3.5.1 Kenya Security Architecture: The Kenya Defence Forces and the 
National Intelligence Service 
Old Security Architecture 
The old security architecture derives its rationale from the colonial state. 
The post-colonial period just tinkered with the architecture to serve the 
new state. Currently, the architecture is built around what is known as 
Kenya Security Intelligence Machinery. At the top, is the Cabinet Security 
Committee (CSC) chaired by the President.  Below it is the National 
Security Advisory Committee (NSAC); the Joint Security Intelligence 
Secretariat (JSIS) serves as the operational arm of the NSAC Away from 
Nairobi, the Provincial Security Intelligence Committee (PSIC) serves the 
provinces while the District Security Intelligence Committee (DSIC) is 
operational at the district level. These are not constitutional or statutory 
structures. Similarly, they are not created through policy instruments. 
They are administrative. As such they tend to operate in an ad hoc 














(Source: The Consulting House. In: Ngunyi et al (2010). Re-engineering the National Security 
Architecture. Nairobi: The Consulting House) 
 
With regard to the Defence Forces, the Armed Forces Act of 1968 
provided the military a supplementary role of supporting civil institutions. 
The new architecture conceives this differently as this study shall show 
later. On its part, the military created two commands: the East and West 
Com. But these were not aligned with the internal security structures on 
the ground. Internal security structures, including the regular and 
administration police force, Kenya Wildlife Services, and Kenya Forest 
Services, operate through an administratively created command. The 
multiplicity of these units has resulted in command and control issues, 
resulting in tensions among them. In addition, their deployments 
consistently distort the force to space ratios and the ability to provide 
security127 
 
New Security Architecture 
The new National Security Architecture proposed in the new constitution 
has the People at the top as shown by diagram 2 below. Article 1(1) of 
the new constitution clearly stipulates that: “… (ALL) sovereign power 
                                                     












belongs to the people of Kenya and shall be exercised only in accordance 
with this constitution”. This re-affirms citizen centrality in state security 
as the first object of securitization. But the people sovereignty is exercised 
through their representatives128 
 
 (Source: The Consulting House. In: Ngunyi et al (2010). Re-engineering the National 
Security  Architecture. Nairobi: The Consulting House) 
 
Gaps in the Security Architecture 
Under Article 238(2) a of the new 2010 constitution “... National security 
is subject to authority of the Constitution and parliament”. This means 
that the people will delegate their supreme power to parliament. Unlike 
in the past where the National Security Organs were responsible to the 
Executive, the ‘line management’ has shifted to parliament, acting on 
behalf of the people129. This is represented in the diagrams above. 
 
Therefore, the new security architecture removes decision-making 
powers from a singular structure (executive) to a monolithic structure 
(Parliament).  This means that multiple interests will be at play in 
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deciding on critical issues such as deployment and appointments130. In 
this regard, an implementation gap still exists in the security architecture. 
This means that, the new security architecture, just like the old one, will 
not function properly.  While there will be delays in making decisions of 
security matters in the country, such as deployment of security officials in 
the community, the militia groups will take this opportunity to provide 
this service to individuals and communities.  
 
Therefore, the poor functioning of the state security architecture leads to 
the rampant rise and proliferation of militia groups. They rise to provide 
protection to the communities and meet the needs of the people that the 
government ought to be addressing but are delaying due to weak 
structures.  
 
Therefore to avoid this gap, policies and administrative interventions 
should be aligned in such a way as to avoid deployment delays in 
provision of security and other services to the citizens by the government. 
Otherwise, militia groups will continue to exist and provide services in 
place of the government. 
 
3.6 National Police service 
The National Police Service consists of the Kenya Police and the 
Administration Police (Constitution, Section 243). While there are 
operational differences between these two branches, there are also many 
similarities both in legislation and in practice. The Kenyan Criminal 
Procedure Code (Chapter 75, Section 2) states that “Police Officer” shall refer 
to an officer of both the Kenyan Police Force and the Administration Police. 
Similarly, the Kenyan Penal Code (Chapter 63) states that the “Police Force” 
shall include both the Kenyan Police and the Administration Police. Among 
other things, police required to respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms (Constitution, Section 244).  














3.6.1 Kenyan Police Force 
The functions of the Kenyan Police Force are outlined by the Police Act of 
1961 (Chapter 84), in conjunction with the Police Regulations of 1961 
(which were incorporated into the 1988 revised edition of the Police Act) 
and the Standing Orders, which were most recently revised in 2001131. 
The Standing Orders provide general instructions for behaviour and are 
issued by the General Commissioner of Police. Section 14 of the Police Act 
(1988) lists the functions of the police, which include the maintenance of 
law and order, preservation of the peace, protection of life and property, 
prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders, and the 
enforcement of all laws and regulations with which the Force is charged. 
The police are also mandated to regulate traffic (S 26, 27) and to maintain 
public order (16.1). However, it is interesting to note that the police force 
is legally allowed to be privately hired132 
 
The vision of the Kenya Police is: “…To be a world-class Police Service, 
with a people-friendly, responsive professional workforce”. The Mission 
of the Kenya Police is: “…to provide quality Police service to the Kenyan 
Public; by upholding the rule of law and creating and maintaining strong 
community partnerships conducive to social, economic and political 
development in Kenya”133 
 
An initial search for the overall size of the Kenyan Police Force yields no 
results, however, information for certain districts is available. The Kenyan 
Police force is divided into eight policing provinces, which are then 
subdivided into divisions. Combined with the 12 specialized “formations,” 
there are 20 departments in all134. Rift Valley Province is the largest in 
terms of policing, and has 22 police divisions, 91 police stations, and 
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personnel of 4,277 for a population that is expected to be over 9 million 
people135 
 
3.6.2 Administration Police 
The Administration Police is a parallel force within the National Police 
Service. This branch was established by the Administration Police Act of 
1958 during colonial rule, and is subject to its own Standing Orders136. 
Originally a tool of “control” over indigenous people, the Administration 
Police force was moved to the Office of the Prime Minister, and later the 
President, at Kenya’s independence137. The Administration Police report 
to the Minister of Internal Security, through local provincial heads. A 
Police Commandant heads them, and there are eight Provincial 
Commands and three units: the Administration Police Training College, 
the Security of Government Buildings Unit (SGB), and the Rapid 
Deployment Unit (RDU).138 According to one evaluation, there are 
currently approximately 18, 000 Administration Police officers. The 
vision of the administrative police is: to be the leading community safety 
provider with a focus on quality service to the public. Their mission is: 
The Administration Police exists to contribute to National Development 
through provision of sustainable peace and tranquillity to all people in 
Kenya139 
The primary piece of legislation regarding the Administration Police is the 
same document that founded them—the Administration of Police Act of 
1958 (Chapter 85). However, numerous other Kenyan laws – Chapters 63, 
75, 85, 128—outline the function and purposes of the force. The 
responsibilities of the Administration Police include: executing orders 
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and warrants, preserving the public peace, assisting Government officers 
in the exercise of their lawful duties, preventing the commission of offences 
and apprehending offenders140. Like the Kenyan Police, the Administration 
Police can be privately hired 
 
3.6.3 Community Policing Strategies 
Since 2003, the Government of Kenya and other agencies have embraced 
“community policing” as a core crime prevention strategy especially 
against the militia operations in the community141. The official website of 
the Administrative Police quotes the United Nations on aspects of 
community policing and democratic policing, and while it doesn’t specify 
exactly what its role will be vis-à-vis these partners, it emphasizes the key 
role of creating partnerships for information-sharing and collaboration142 
 
The Kenya Police Force is clearer in its approach to community policing, 
and more explicitly recognizes this strategy as a means towards reducing 
crime143. As prescribed by the constitution of Kenya, the role of the Kenya 
Police is to help create Community Police Forums (CPFs), while 
communities are to supplement police patrols with private guards and 
neighbourhood watch programs. An evaluation of police and crime 
prevention in Kenya summarizes the primary crime prevention activities 
of parties invol ed in community policing as: visible policing, informal 
community surveillance and neighbourhood watch activities; as well as 
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The constitution of Kenya has been a major point of contention since Kenya 
gained its independence in 1963. The independence constitution was 
replaced by the 1969 constitution, which was recently replaced by the Kenya 
constitution of 2010. In this chapter we have explored how these changes 
affected the system of government i.e. it legislative and administrative arms. 
We further looked at the existing security frameworks dealing with militia in 
Kenya; The security architecture and the police force.  
 
We have seen that historically indigenous inhabitants of the land now called 
Kenya existed in harmony. However the advent of the state government 
inherited from the British colonial powers brought with it the competition for 
power. This created tribal rivalry as both the 1st and 2nd presidents of the 
Republic of Kenya sort to create ethnic elite. This was the genesis of ethnic 
affiliated criminal gangs both adhoc and organized as they fought for control 
over urban property, land or petty trade. 
 
Further, we examined the old and new security architecture, structure of the 
local and central government, as well as the police force. This examination 
exposed the inadequacies of the existing security architecture in Kenya as 
well as its inadequacies in dealing with organised criminal groups. Due to the 
poor functioning of the legislative, administrative and security systems in 
Kenya, a vacuum in service delivery by the government has been created. The 
illegal groups aforementioned have arisen and operate in this vacuum.  This 


















4. THE RISE OF MILITIA IN KENYA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to respond to the first research question of this study: “…Is the 
proliferation of organic and organized criminal groups in Kenya a function of state 
policy failure?” 
 
In the past few decades, there has been an increase in militia emergence and 
activities around the world. Africa is host to many of such groups, with the most 
affected countries being Somalia, Democratic republic of Congo, Sudan and 
Nigeria145. Kenya has also been affected by the proliferation of these militia 
groups especially among the poor populace where poverty, unemployment, 
marginalisation, ethnic inequalities, economic disparity, and unequal 
distribution of national resources and services are commonplace146.  
 
This chapter will investigate the emergence of these groups in Kenya, and their 
spread. We will look at the change in demographics in Kenya over the years, 
growth of slums and the declining rate of service delivery among the urban poor. 
This will help us see if these have contributed to the proliferation of organic and 
organized criminal groups in Kenya. We will use the Mungiki and Sabaot Land 
Defence Force (SLDF) as case studies to investigate the formation and activities 
of these groups. Our focus will be on whether the ineffectiveness of the 
government to deliver services has created a gap in which these groups can 
operate as they emerge as alternative service providers. 
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a. Population Growth 
Kenya’s population growth has grown exponentially over the years. Kenya 
is experiencing an annual growth rate of over 1 million per year causing an 
imbalance in population growth as compared to the national economic 
growth rate. According to the 2009 population census Kenya’s total 
population stood at 38,610,097 compared to only 6 million in 1950. The 
total population increased to 15.3 million in 1979 to 21.4 million in 1989, to 
28.7 in 1999 and to 38.6 million in 2009 as illustrated in the figure 
below147. 
 
Figure 4: Population Growth since Independence 
 
(source: Ngunyi et al (2011). From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence. Nairobi: TCH) 
 
The 2009 Census data revealed that Kenya like most African countries 
suffers a high rate of infant mortality, low life expectancy and high rate of 
lack of services for many of the urban poor and rural populations. This high 
rate of population growth has adverse effects on the governments spending 
                                                     













on infrastructure, health, education, environment, water and other social 
and economic sectors. 
 
b. Urbanization and Slum formation 
A direct consequence of this growth in population has been an increased 
rate of urbanization and by extension slum formation in Kenyan cities and 
towns as well as other African countries. It is interesting to note that the 
world is now midway through the so-called ‘second urbanization wave’, 
which is expected to result in the urbanization of nearly 4 billion people in 
less than a century (1950 ‐ 2030). The large majority of the additional 3 
billion people expected to be living on earth by 2050 will more than likely 
end up in Asian and African cities if current trends continue148. 
Urbanization rates in Africa are the highest in the world at 3.3%149, and if 
Africa is to go from 40% to 60% urbanized by 2050, urban populations will 
increase from the current 373 million to 1.2 billion150.   
 
The main challenge presented by the second wave of urbanization for 
Nairobi and other developing countries’ cities is the proliferation of slums 
as cities struggle to meet the demands of growing populations. According to 
a UN Habitat report entitled The Challenge of Slums, there were a billion 
people living in slums by 2003. In other words, by 2003 a third of the 
people living in the cities of the world lived in a slum151. The report defines 
a slum as a settlement made up of households that lack one or more of the 
following conditions: access to improved water, access to improved 
sanitation facilities (minimally, a pit latrine with a slab), sufficient living 
area (not more than three people sharing the same room), structural 
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quality and durability of dwellings, and security of tenure152. 
 
Slums present a particularly significant problem for Africa’s cities. Although 
half of the world’s slum dwellers are in Asian cities, it is only in sub-Saharan 
Africa that one finds cities where the majority of the populations live in 
slums. In Kenya, the first squatter settlements emerged during the colonial 
period when the colonial administration discouraged the provision of large-
scale public housing for the African population in order to curtail the influx 
of Africans into Nairobi153. When the restriction of the migration of Africans 
to Nairobi was lifted following independence the population in Nairobi 
increased from 350,000 in 1963 to 4 million inhabitants today154. The 
increasing demand has not been matched by a well-planned provision of 
adequate housing and basic government services155.  
 
Therefore the growth of informal settlements and poor service provision by 
the government has accompanied the growth of the population. In part the 
failure of government authorities to provide access to land, housing and 
services to the growing number of residents can be attributed to the lack of 
financial resources and poor management156. However, this lack of finance 
and management failures is also an endogenous outcome of poor policies. A 
critical priority for the international community and African Governments 
has then become to reconsider what actions will be required now to ensure 
effective services for slum populations that may increase by an additional 
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800 million inhabitants157. 
 
4.3 Service Delivery 
4.3.1 The Government of Kenya 
During the first decade of independence in Kenya, the Growth Domestic 
Product (GDP) grew by an average of 6.6%158.  This growth was due to 
successful rural development policies, import substitution industrialization 
strategies among other factors. However, the period that followed showed a 
decline in the economy with a growth rate of 2.5 and 2.0 per cent in 1990-
1995 and 1996-2000 respectively. This poor performance was mainly due 
to poor governance, poor infrastructure, depressed investment, decline in 
donor support, increase in population, as well as introduction of multi party 
democracy in Kenya159.  
 
The poor economic performance over the past two decades exacerbated the 
difficulties facing Kenyans. There has been reduction in real expenditure on 
basic social services namely health and nutrition, education, water and 
sanitation, which are essential for poverty reduction. Over the period 1980-
1997, real expenditures in these services declined from about 20 per cent of 
the government budget in 1980 to about 12.4 per cent by 1997. On 
education, the decline was from 23 per cent to 19 per cent; on health and 
nutrition it was from 10 per cent to 6 per cent160. This is shown in the table 
below. 
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AGRICULTURE 4.6 3.9 3.3 0.4 1.1 
MANUFACTURING 9.1 10.0 4.8 3.0 1.3 
FINANCE, REAL 
ESTATE 
9.8 12.4 6.7 6.6 3.6 
GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES 
16.9 6.5 4.9 2.6 1.0 
PRIVATE HOUSE 
HOLDS 
3.5 14.5 10.8 10.3 5.6 
OTHERS - 8.8 7.7 3.6 2.3 
TOTAL GDP 6.6 5.2 4.1 2.5 2.0 
 
(SOURCE: Olum, G.H. Report on Status and Implementation of National Policy on Ageing in 
Kenya: Prepared for UNDESA. Kenya: UNDESA) 
 
As the table above indicates, the increase in population since independence 
has led urbanization and slum formation in the cities and eventually the 
increase in demand of government services. However, according to the 
statistics, the government is unable to match up to this increase in demand 
of its services, leading to poor performance in the various sectors. Further, 
according to a report published annually by the Foreign Policy Magazine 
and the fund for peace, Kenya ranks 16 in the failed state index for 2012162.  
According to this report, Kenya scores 8.9% with regards to demographic 
pressures, 8.1% with regards to poor public services and 7.3% with regards 
to economic decline. These scores together with other variables used such 
economic stability, refugee status/IDPs, and security contributed to Kenya 
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being ranked highly as a failed state. A sample of this is represented in the 
table below. 



























































































































































































7.4 7.6 9.0 8.4 
 
Sample Source: Foreign Policy online magazine. Available at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive 
 
This shows that government is unable to meet the needs of all the 
population in the country due to its poor management and financial 
capacity, and poor policies. The increasing demand has not been matched 
by a well-planned provisional capacity by the government.  
From these statistics, it is evident that Kenya entered the 21st century with a 
formidable challenge of reversing declining economic growth, generating 
employment opportunities, reducing both unemployment and poverty 
among the people.  However it is imperative to note that the government 
has put up policy measures to address these socio-economic challenges. 
These include the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP)-1999-2015; 
Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 
(ERSWEC) 2003-2007 and the short term Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) 2001-2004163.  
 
Despite having these policies in place, the government services have 




                                                     













Figure 5: Decline of Government Services 
 
 
Service Provision: 2009 Census Data 
Water: 
Water is a crucial basic human need for survival, and whose availability 
enhances economic growth. The table below shows the availability of water 
(% households) according to the 2009 Kenya census. 
 
Sanitation: 
Poor sanitary conditions impact on prevailing health standards of local 
people and hence development. The table below shows the main mode of 














Inequalities in service Provision 
Access to basic public services especially in Nairobi’s slums is low. Less than 
one fifth of the slum households have access to piped water, that is private in-
house connections or yard taps. The vast majority of slum dwellers rely on 
water kiosks to buy water from private providers164. In the contrary, studies 
reporting data for Nairobi as a whole place the proportion of households with 
access to piped water at 71 percent165. This representation is not true for 
slum households. 
 
This inequality in access to basic services also applies to electricity 
connections. About 22% of slum households in Nairobi slums are connected 
to electricity and uses it as a lighting fuel. This is about one in every five 
households in Nairobi slums. In contrast, Nairobi city as a whole records an 
average of 52% of electricity connections in households166. With regards to 
garbage, less than one in a hundred slum-households, which is about 0.9% of 
slum households are served by a public collection system despite the 
negative externalities of garbage167. 
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Due to Nairobi’s spatial segregation according to income these exemplary 
figures illustrate that residents of higher income areas are provided with 
better infrastructure services than the urban poor living in the slums168. The 
government justifies this by the fact that slums are informal settlements and 
that the delivery of services would be equivalent to their official 
recognition169. 
 
However, what casts doubt on the official justification is that public officials 
in Kibera slums in Nairobi tend to divert available water from the existing 
piped network to neighboring high-income areas where both revenue 
collection and political influence are greater170. This suggests that, the better 
service delivery coverage of high-income areas results from successful 
lobbying of higher income groups171.  Therefore, if slum dwellers could 
access reasonable quality services at affordable price from alternative 
providers, they would not loose from the lack of public services’ provision.  
 
4.3.2 Private Service Providers 
Private agents have partly filled the gap left by public service providers in 
Nairobi slums. As a result, slum dwellers have to pay high prices for water, 
which is often contaminated, for electricity, private garbage collection among 
other services172. The low coverage of electricity of a private garbage 
collection system indicates that slum households are unwilling or unable to 
pay for commercial providers173. 
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Many of the Community Based Organizations -operated pay- per-use latrines 
have deteriorated over time due to maintenance problems. However, the lack 
of alternatives in the slums has turned private service provision into a 
profitable business174. Water kiosk owners, in particular, can earn high 
revenues. Slum households pay on average KES 100/m3 (US$1.33/m3) at 
water kiosks. This is eight times the price of the lowest tariff block for 
domestic connections.  
 
The deliberate exclusion of informal settlements from public services and the 
inability of slum dwellers to afford alternative private service provision have 
led to the emergence of a third group of service providers- the militia. These 
are small youth groups that have come together to provide those services to 
the community that the government has failed to provide. These include 
water, sanitation, electricity and security.  They fill in the gaps left by public 
service providers and private commercial service providers. Since the slum 
dwellers cannot afford alternative services provided by private agent, these 
militia groups provide these services illegally but at a lower cost.  
 
This proliferation of militia groups especially in informal settlements is as a 
result of poor governance, which has led to increase in poverty, 
unemployment, marginalization, ethnic inequalities, economic disparity and 
unequal distribution of natural resources and services175. However, it is 
important to note that these militia groups existed way before the decline of 
government services in Kenya. It is the agenda and activity of these groups 
that has changed since the 1980’s to today. 
                                                     
174 Huchzermeyer, M. (2008). Slum Upgrading in Nairobi within the Housing and Basic Services Market. A Housing Rights 
Concern. Journal of Asian and African Studies 43(1): 19–39. 
175 Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (2010). Militias, Rebels and Islamists Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crisis 












4.3.3 Illegal Service Providers 
The exclusion of informal settlements from public services and the inability 
of slum dwellers to afford alternative private service provision have led to 
the emergence of a third group of service providers- the militia (Organic and 
organized criminal groups). These are often youth groups that have come 
together to provide those services to the community that the government has 
failed to provide and are too expensive to source from private service 
companies. These include water, sanitation, electricity and security. These 
groups provide these services illegally but at a lower cost. Details of how 
these groups operate are discussed in the 2 case studies below under the 
activities and operations of the Mungiki and the SLDF. 
 
4.4 The rise of militia in Kenya 
The rise of militia groups in Kenya can be historically traced back to the youth 
wing of the former ruling party KANU176; famously known as the KANU youth 
Wing, or the ‘Youth Wingers’. In the 1960’s the KANU youth wing was used to 
intimidate political opponents-such as KADU177, and KPU178, which were 
campaigning against the ruling party. In the 1980’s, politicians used the KANU 
youth wing as a violent gang of supporters, generally of the same ethnic 
group179. The young people were paid and offered incentives and jobs as tokens 
for their gang support for politicians. All elections during this one party era 
witnessed the youth wingers being hired by politicians to harass and disrupt 
the opposition’s rallies. The KANU youth wingers therefore served as breeding 
ground for the rise of militia and criminal gangs in Kenya180.  
Thereafter, during the multiparty period, the youth wingers transformed 
themselves into criminal gangs and militia groups with the objective of 
                                                     
176 Kenya African National Union 
177 Kenya African Democratic Union 
178 Kenya People’s Union 
179 Wamucii, P. (2010). HSRC Review. Youth (in)Security: Lessons from Kenya. 8(2) 
180 Adams Oloo. (2010). Marginalisation and Rise of Militia Groups in Kenya. In , Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe 













violently intimidating and disenfranchising the opposition supporters, 
especially those in the ‘KANU areas’. As a result, other criminal gangs started 
emerge to protect their own ethnic groups from this violence. This was 
instrumental in the formation and rise of the Mungiki post 1992 elections. They 
formed to protect the Kikuyu from the violence that had erupted in the Rift 
valley region to rid Rift valley of outsiders181.  
 
In 1997, the youth wingers, who had now transformed into the ‘Kalenjin 
Warriors’ and the ‘Maasai Morans’ were being trained and armed in the coastal 
provinces by prominent politicians and with the support of the government 
and the military. They were then deployed to fuel ethnic violence in the run-up 
to the 1997 elections182.  As a result, opposition sponsored criminal groups-
such the Jeshi la Embakasi, Baghdad Boys etc, started to emerge to protect the 
opposition parties from the state sponsored militia groups during election 
campaigns. This led to the rise of various non-state militia groups in various 
parts of Kenya.  
 
According to a study done for the UNDP on the “Law of Gang Polarity”, every 
time a dominant gang emerges in a locality, a counter-force emerges183. In the 
case of Mungiki for both Nairobi and Eldoret, the counter-force is Taliban. In 
Mombasa, the polarity is between MRC184 and Sungu Sungu. And in all these 
cases, the counter-force seems to have a higher level of community legitimacy 
compared to the core-militia.  
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The flow, therefore, is as follows: a dominant group emerges, a counter-force to 
oppose it is birthed by community, and then the counter-force becomes the 
dominant militia with time. This is how the vigilante groups opposed to 
Mungiki were formed. The Taliban, for instance, was formed in 2001 as a 
counter- force to Mungiki in the slums of Eastlands, Nairobi. There were ethnic 
undercurrents at the time of formation, with Taliban largely recruiting from the 
Luo community in these areas, who felt harassed and exploited by the ‘Kikuyu’ 
Mungiki. In 2002, the two groups clashed violently over control of the 
transport sector in Mathare, a battle that Mungiki prevailed by use of sheer 
numbers and brutal tactics185. In the aftermath, 21 people were reported dead 
with scores of others injured and it resulted in a blanket ba  on 18 armed 
groups among them both Mungiki and Taliban186. In 2007, the confrontation 
between the two groups assumed political overtones with Taliban allegedly 
allied to ODM and Mungiki affiliated to PNU187. The table below is a small 
sample of the different militia groups present in Kenya today, their areas of 
operation and activities.  
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Table 4: Criminal Groups and Militia Gangs in Kenya, Areas of Operation 
and Activities 
 
CRIMINAL GANG AREAS OF OPERATION OBJECTIVE/ACTIVITIES/EFFECT 
Sabaot Land Defence Force Mt. Elgon area, Chebyuk III settlement 
scheme 
Civilian atrocities, Cattle rustling, 600 
deaths, Extortion 





Combat Training,Attacks on tourists 
and wealthy Caucasian expatriates, 
Illegal arms purchases from Somalia 
Kaya Bombo Raiders Kwale, Likoni, Kaya Bombo forest, 
south coast, Similani Caves 
Oathing, August 13 Likoni attacks on 
administration buildings and market 
stalls operated by upcountry vendors 
Raid on Likoni Police station/ Ferry 
Post 
Mungiki Kiambu District, Nairobi 
Province, Naivasha, Nakuru, Molo, 
Rongai, Laikipia (ol Jabit) 
Extortion 
 racketeering188 
Mass murder and targeted Killings 
Kidnappings 
Post Election Violence 
 
(Source: The Consulting House: Ngunyi et al (2011). From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence. 
Nairobi)
                                                     












CRIMINAL GANG AREAS OF OPERATION OBJECTIVE/ACTIVITIES/EFFECT 
Sungu Sungu Nairobi, Rift valley Political Violence 
Chinkororo Kisii, Sotik, Bure Armed engagements with Kalenjin 
warriors in PEV 
Retaliatory cattle rustling attacks 
Alleged Election violence  
Kalenjin Warriors Trans Nzoia, Kericho, Bomet, 
Borabu/Sotik border, Uasin Gishu 
Attacks and evictions of non-Kalenjin 
communities during PEV 
Baghdad Boys Kisumu, Kibera Kisumu PEV Lootings Dec 2007 
Jeshi la Mzee/ Kamjesh Kangemi, Kawangware Extortion/ Protection racketeering 
targeting public service operators 
Election violence 
Jeshi la Embakasi  Embakasi Political Violence and Intimidation 
Taleban Nairobi, Eastlands, Mathare, Huruma, 
Baba Dogo, Kariobangi North, 
Kariobangi South, Kasarani 
Extortion of public service operators 
on juja road 
Siafu Kibera Tenant eviction during PEV Control of 
slum housing, utilities, sanitary 
facilities, illicit brews 
Thaai Nairobi North, Mathare 
 
Security’, Solving disputes  
Bukhungu Mashimoni, Lindi, Kibera Tenant eviction during PEV Control of 
slum housing, utilities, sanitary 
facilities, 
Al Shabaab North East Kenya, Garissa, Wajir, 
Mandera, Eastleigh, South ‘B’, 
KariobaNgi/Kariokor 
Recruitment of combatants from 
Somali-dominated refugee camps  
Money laundering  
Arms smuggling 
Revenue raising through Tax evasion 
Proceeds from piracy activity 
 
(Source: The Consulting House: Ngunyi et al (2011). From Monopoly to Oligopoly of 
Violence. Nairobi) 
 
NB: The table above is only a sample of the total number of militia groups in Kenya, no 
criteria of selection was used. 
 
Most of the Militia groups in Kenya have an ethnic orientation, even though 
this is not their main reason for their formation. This is attributed to the fact 
that most regions in Kenya are ethnically populated. For example, the central 
province is home for the Kikuyu, the Nyanza Province is home for the Luo 
while the Rift valley is home for the Kalenjin. In addition, in the urban areas, 












been an increase in ethnic violence in Kenya.  Most of the militia groups form 
to protect their own ethnic interests in the community. As a result, counter-
ethnic groups begin to emerge and violence erupts between the two opposing 
militia groups. Even during elections, the politicians use some of these ethnic 
militia groups to gather support from their ethnic community. Therefore, 
non-state ethnic militias are the most common type of militia groups in 
Kenya. 
 
Nevertheless, ethnicity is not the main reason for the formation of militia 
groups in Kenya. Poverty and social exclusion of communities from 
mainstream service provision in slum areas by the government is one of the 
driving forces for the proliferation of militia groups in Kenya. As this study 
has analysed in this chapter, the increase in population, especially in the 
urban areas, has a direct correlation with the decrease in government 
services. This is due to the fact that government policies have not been 
efficiently reviewed and revised to adapt to the increase in population. 
Therefore, the old policies that were used to govern a smaller percentage of 
population are still the same ones governing the enormous increase in 
numbers. This automatically leads to poor financial management by the 
government, which ultimately affects how government distributes basic 
services to the people. The demand for basic services is more than the supply. 
As a result, the needs of the populations end up not being met by the 
government.  
 
Despite the fact that there are over 30 militia groups in Kenya, the most 
dominant groups are six in number-commonly known as the ‘Big Six’.  
Mungiki is the most dominant, with its presence felt in almost all the counties 
in Kenya. It has various variations such as the Thaai, Mukuru kwa Njenga, 
among others. It is involved in ‘soft insecurity’189 tasks such as offering 
protections services to the slum dwellers, and providing services such as 
electricity that the government has failed to provide in the high-density 
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areas. The second is the Taliban.  Unlike the Mungiki, they have a better 
acceptance in the community. They operate mostly in the Nairobi slums. The 
members of Taliban are known to communicate by a system of hand signals. 
They, like the Mungiki, also run extortion rackets, especially of the public 
transport operators. The third group is the Mombasa Republican Council 
(MRC), which is largely present in the coastal areas with extensions such as 
the Mulungunipa and Kaya Bombo190. It is believed that retired military 
officers from the region are behind its operation, whose ultimate goal is to 
overthrow the Kenyan Government. The fourth is the Bagdad boys, a 
dominant group in Kisumu, in the Nyanza province. However, they have 
variations in Eldoret in the Rift Valley province. In Eldoret, they are a 
‘franchise outlet’ of the group in Nyanza, however, in Huruma, they are a 
counterfeit- mainly composed of the Kikuyu community191. They are known 
for their expertise in using sling stones. The fifth is the Sungu Sungu. This 
group of gangs are present in most counties in Kenya. However, they are 
differentiated in terms of core business, central command and operation192. 
In Mombasa, for instance, they are hired to protect a group of ‘up-country’ 
business people. Lastly, is the Kamjesh, who are mostly know for 
Racketeering and Extortions targeting public service operators.  
 
Most criminal gangs in Kenya use “tough labels193” to protect a section of the 
community as well as their own interests. This phenomenon of tough 
labelling was started during the post-election violence in 2008, which 
therefore heightened ethnic violence in the country. As much as the labelling 
has worked, it has also deepened the mystery behind militia proliferation in 
Kenya. For instance, the Mungiki label has been franchised to smaller 
formations that are used to police Mungiki interests and scavenge around 
small-scale businesses, rather than being involved in securing the 
community. Therefore, the proliferation of militia in Kenya has taken 
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different forms. Some militia groups are formed to provide protection to their 
communities from other ethnic groups; others are formed as racketeers, and 
thus are a source of job opportunities for the unemployed. Others are formed 
to scavenge around already existing small businesses especially of the public 
service operators such as Matatus. However, most of these groups are 
considered to be community-friendly than predatory, and are a threat to the 
government.  
 
Therefore, if this phenomenon continues, the proliferation of militia groups 
in Kenya will continue to rise. This is of particular threat to the government, 
in terms of providing security and services to its citizens. However, to the 
citizens, it is a form of solace, knowing that a gang exists to protect their 
interests. Therefore, the question is: what is the government doing to address 
this issue? What strategies is it applying? And will it be successful. This study 
shall attempt to address this later on. 
 
4.4.1 The Mungiki 
a) Formation 
Mungiki originated as a Spiritual group in the 1980’s. Most scholars agree 
that it might have begun in 1987194. Mungiki means masses or multitude 
of people, and because of their numbers, the Mungiki has become a 
political force and a political threat. It can be traced back to its founding 
members Maina Njenga and Ndura Waruinge, who claim to have had a 
dream from god asking them to “go and liberate my people”.  According to 
them, the dream was leading them to help the Kikuyu community that 
were affected by clashes in the Rift Valley province. The Kikuyu 
community had been the target group of these clashes in the Rift Valley 
province during the run-down to the 1992 elections.  Therefore, the 
Mungiki recruited most of its members who were greatly affected by the 
                                                     












clashes in Molo, Elbourgon, Rongai, Narok, Laikipia and Eldoret195. Their 
Agenda was to mobilise masses against the government, which they 
argued fuelled the ethnic clashes.  
The original philosophy of the Mungiki is unity, self-sacrifice and power in 
numbers.  Therefore, their recruitment process is four pronged. A person 
can be a member voluntarily by attending their spiritual meetings and 
getting inspired to be part of the group. Advocacy is another way that the 
members of the Mungiki get to be recruited. They convince relatives and 
friends about their beliefs and culture and encourage them to join. 
Thirdly, the Mungiki also use forceful oath taking that bind the new 
members to the ideals of the militia. The oaths include the oath of 
initiation-called kuhagira, oath of repentance know as horohio, Oaths to 
prepare for combat know as mbitika, and a continuous oath know as 
exodus196. Lastly, are those who join because they have been impressed by 
the work of the militia e.g. restoring security in the slums, or providing 
services such as electricity in the slums197. Most of these members are 
followers from the lower social classes such as street children, 
unemployed youth etc, as well as the urban poor living in the slums.  
 
The Mungiki have no highly centralised structure. However, it operates by 
a set of 48 rules of the gang, which call for unpredictability and invisibility 
of the members and their activities198. The founding members encouraged 
the Mungiki members to go back to their fundamental Kikuyu way of life. 
As a result, the Mungiki reject the western customs such as the use of 
drugs and alcohol as symbols of Western decadence. They sought to 
revive the Kikuyu culture and spiritualism such as songs, prophetic 
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utterances, oath taking, initiation rites etc, as a step towards liberation of 
its people and a means of resolving social problems199.   
 
                                                     













The Mungiki believe that Mt. Kenya is the dwelling place of god, and where 
members should look for signs from god.  
 
However, According to Adam Oloo, “although the Mungiki is depicted as a 
religio-cultural organisation, it remains to a large extent an entity searching 
for political power”200. Mungiki operates in multitudes. And because of their 
numbers, they are a political threat. In 2003, the government criminalised 
them, and at this point their objectives changed. They started taking control 
of the slums, and it is here they are believed to extort millions and rule with 
an iron fist. 
 
b) Agenda and activities 
The Mungiki control most of the Nairobi slums. They prey on the poorest by 
taking over the slums and setting up huge extortion rackets. They brutally 
execute anyone who challenges their rule. However, according to some 
Mungiki members, the poverty being experienced in the slum areas is what 
led them to come up with a ‘welfare system’ that the government cannot or 
has not created for them.  
 
The Mungiki has adopted the use of cell groups to spread its influence. The 
community appreciate the presence of the Mungiki because they offer them 
protection, security and food. A good example is the Dandora dumpsite, 
which used to be home to dangerous gangs.  When the Mungiki came in, 
they organised the people living in Dandora and working at the dumpsite 
into cell groups of 10 people. Each group was allocated a portion of the 
dumpsite where they could operate without any disturbance. Their work is 
to collect plastic waste for KES 10 per bag. Therefore, according to Maina 
Kiai- chairman of the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights 
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(KNCHR), the Mungiki has created job opportunities and businesses for the 
poor, that’s why they are a threat to the government.  
 
Further, the Mungiki has taken over the provision of services such as 
supplying water and electricity, Management of public transport system, 
levying illegal taxes, and extorting protection money. They have taken over 
the provision of these services in the central province as well as in Nairobi. 
In other words, they have set up a parallel government - the Mungiki 
Government, with a tax collection machinery and judiciary system201.  
 
According to news reports, the Mungiki are not always popular with 
communities. Some slums such as the Mathare slums in Nairobi accuse the 
Mungiki of exploitation and murder. According to the residents of the 
slums, although the Mungiki at first were welcomed in the slum due to the 
protection and provisions they gave to the slum dwellers in Mathare202, 
they became an un-wanted gang in the area when they started charging for 
their services and killing anyone who refused to adhere to their terms. The 
Mungiki stole electricity from the Kenya Power and lighting and brought it 
to the slums. However, the slum dwellers had to pay KES 300 per bulb per 
month. They further, asked for protection fees of KES 30 in areas they 
operated, as well as collected levies from kiosk owners and vegetable 
vendors of between KES 150-300 each. They claimed that they came to fill 
in the gap that the government has failed to fill in the slum areas.  With the 
help of the ‘Kwekwe squad’- a secret police squad that is after the Mungiki 
but was later disbanded; some parts of Mathare slums were able to get rid 
of the Mungiki in the area.  
 
The Mungiki also man most feeder roads in the central province. They 
collect KES 50 from every vehicle leaving the main roads and approaching 
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their roadblocks in the interior203.  Other sources of income for the Mungiki 
include garbage collection, charges for using public facilities such as toilets, 
charges to small businesses, as well as membership fees from Mungiki 
members. The Mungiki members contribute KES 3 per month. This adds up 
to about 4 million Kenya shillings per month204.  
 
From the Matatu industry (a form of public vehicle in Kenya), the Mungiki 
collects about KES 200 from each Matatu, leading to a total of about KES 10, 
000 per day. Further, they collect KES 1000, and KES 400 from Matatu 
drivers and conductors respectively, for them to be allowed to operate in 
their routes205. They also operate a motorcycle taxi service in the central 
province, where they get more revenues for their activities.  
 
In addition to this, the political elites also support this ‘bandit economy’ by 
paying Mungiki members to gather up support for their political parties 
during the election campaigns. Therefore, the Mungiki continues to thrive 
due to this bandit economy they operate as their source of existence and 
sustenance.  
 
However, this bandit economy may not be thriving, as it is, if the 
government policies were functioning properly. The poor functioning of 
government policies has created a gap that the militia groups are thriving 
in. If the government had an effective system of providing services such as 
electricity, water, sanitation, and security to the individuals living in the 
slum areas, then, the exploitation of the poor by the militia groups would 
not be taking place. The community only demands these services from the 
militias because the government has failed to provide them. 
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4.4.2 Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) 
a) Formation 
The Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) was formed in 2006 as an 
organisation fighting against the injustices and discrimination in the 
allocation of land in the Mt. Elgon region. The land clashes in Mt. Elgon that 
led to the formation of SLDF are a result of the Sabaot displacements dating 
back to the colonial era. Land is the dominant factor leading to conflict in 
Mt. Elgon. 
 
In 1932, the colonial government moved the Sabaot community from Trans-
Nzoia to Mt. Elgon to create white highlands. A decade later, in 1948, the 
colonial government suggested to move the Ndorobo (Mosop), a sub tribe of 
the Sabaot community, from the highlands of Chepkitale in order to protect 
the Mt. Elgon Forest206. This move took place in 1971/72, and was known 
as the Chebyuk phase 1 settlement scheme.  In this phase, the government 
moved the Ndorobo (Mosop) from the Chepkitale and created the Chebyuk 
settlement scheme to resettle them. The Scheme consisted of 1489 parcels 
of five acres of land207.  The Phase II of the settlement known as Cheptoror 
began in 1979 when leaders of Sabaot sent a delegation to the then 
president Moi to resettle the landless Sabaot community.  As a result of this 
petition, the Mosop Sub tribe and the Soy sub tribe were resettled on 2, 516 
parcels of land in 1989208.  
 
However, not all the landless people were resettled since the government 
did not complete the settlement initiative. Further, those who were 
resettled lacked legal ownership of the land, as the government failed to 
                                                     
206 Ndungu, J. (2008). Mt.Elgon. In: Wakhungu, J., Nyukuri, E., and Huggins, C. (2008). Land Tenure and Violent Conflict in 
Kenya. Nairobi: Africa Centre for Technology Studies. 













issue them with title deeds209. However, the settlers-mostly the Soy Sub 
tribe- continued to cultivate the land, as well as subdividing it and selling it 
among themselves. The phase three of the settlement scheme know as the 
Chebyuk III began in 2002, after the government cancelled the other two 
schemes for lack of completion.   
 
In 2006, there was controversy over the phase III settlement scheme. The 
Soy sub tribe, which had been resettled in the previous scheme, had to 
surrender part of their land to the Mosop sub-tribe.  This crashed the 
expectation of the Soy community that the surveying and allocation of the 
third phase would eventually formalise their ownership of the land210. As a 
result, the Soy mobilised young people to defend their land and resist any 
evictions, leading to the formation of the SLDF. 
 
The SLDF was therefore established in 2006 as a result of the controversies 
following the Chebyuk phase III settlement. It is composed of mostly the Soy 
Sub tribe of the Sabaot community211. Their main agenda was to resist the 
reallocation of land to other sub-tribes, especially the Mosop Sub-tribe. 
Therefore, land clashes began when the Soy sub tribe was forced to make 
way to the new allotees of the Mosop sub-tribe.  The Mosop therefore 
became the targets of the SLDF, as they were seen as favoured by the 
government in the allocation of land.212 The impact of the conflict that 
erupted as a result of these settlement controversies led to over 600 people 
dead, disruption of socio-economic activities in the area including farming 
thus leading to food insecurity, disruption of education, and massive 
displacement of people213.  The conflict that had began as an inter clan 
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conflict between the Soy sub tribe and the Mosop Sub tribe has since grown 
and spread, with the SLDF now targeting other communities and 
immigrants being allocated land in the area. 
b) Agenda and Activities 
Since its formation in 2006, there has been minimal government presence 
in Mt. Elgon. Therefore the SLDF took into its own hand the initiative to 
settle the conflict in the area. They made their own laws that the inhabitants 
of the area have to adhere to. Further, they established informal courts to 
punish those who acquired land corruptly, as well as petty offenders. In 
addition, they have an administration system that is complete with 
mechanisms for levying illegal taxes214.  
 
The SLDF structure has three divisions. The military, composed of 3000 
men according to the western Kenya Human Rights Watch. The Spiritual, 
which is in charge of oath taking that binds the members to SLDF and 
receiving special charms from the spiritual leader known as the Laibon that 
apparently protects them from the authorities and enemies bullets. Lastly, 
is the political wing which is their driving force215.  The recruitment of the 
SLDF members began as voluntary but ended up being a forceful affair. 
Every Family of the Soy sub tribe had to surrender one of their sons or pay 
a waiver fine of KES 10, 000.  
 
Their operations and activities are almost similar to those of the Mungiki. 
They operate extortion rackets where they collect illegal tax from the 
people. The taxes they collect depend on the nature of work of an 
individual, and their level of income. For those community members in the 
white-collar jobs such as teachers, and civil servants, the taxes are more 
compared to farmers and other domestic workers. They SLDF collect a 
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portion of an individual’s salary, while for farmers; they part with some of 
the sales made from the produce. In addition, they collect part of the food 
produce for every acre of land harvested by the farmers216. 
The SLDF compete with the Mungiki in controlling the public transport 
industry. Just like their counterparts, they collect levies from public 
transport operators on a daily basis.  However, they do not operate in the 
same areas as the Mungiki. These sources of income have made SLDF 
attractive to the unemployed youth from the lower class.  They have created 
job opportunities for this group of individuals, and a source of income for 
their survival. 
 
4.4.3 Mungiki and SLDF: Similarities and Differences 
More similarities than differences can be identified between the two-militia 
groups. One is Mode of operation. Both SLDF and Mungiki are known to 
operate extortion rackets that endanger human security. Most people living 
in the areas that the militia groups operate are now unable to run their 
businesses effectively thus affecting the economy at large.  
 
They are both known to use crude weapons such as the machetes, bows and 
arrows, and occasionally guns. They are known to kill anyone that opposes 
their rule in the community, and therefore instil a sense of fear in the 
people. In addition, they hardly engage directly with the state instruments 
and machinery. They only strike and leave the scene217. Secondly, their 
objectives are mostly influenced by the frustration that they have towards 
the political system. In the case of Mungiki, they claim to exist because they 
are filling gaps in the community that the government has created. The 
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SLDF on the other hand claim to amend the historical injustices related to 
land that has been directed towards the Sabaot community218.  
 
 
Thirdly, in terms of religion and culture, both militia groups subscribe to 
administration of oaths and spiritual guidance. The Mungiki believe that 
they can get help from god who resides on Mt. Kenya. Therefore, they call 
upon the people to return to African traditions and spiritualism in order to 
solve social problems. The SLDF on the other hand have a spiritual leader 
known as the Laibon who offers spiritual guidance to protect them from 
their enemies.  
 
Fourthly, both militia groups have instilled fear in the community due to 
their trails of destruction, killings, and displacements219. Part of the 
community accepts them because they offer protection and job 
opportunities for the young people, while others detest them because of 
exploiting them. 
 
The main differences between the two-militia groups are that one is more 
organised than the other. Despite both having a political, spiritual and 
military wing, the Mungiki are more organised than the SLDF. Further, the 
Mungiki has a greater following than the SLDF.  Secondly, the SLDF operates 
only in a rural setting in the Mt. Elgon and parts of Trans-Nzoia district, 
while the Mungiki operates both in the rural and urban setting220.  As a 
result, the Mungiki are much harder to crack down than the SLDF due to the 
urban surrounding. Finally, Mungiki is known to shift religions whenever it 
is faces repression. It has since changed to Islam and Christianity.  
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However, it is imperative to note that the main reason for the proliferation 
and operation of these militia groups is due to poor state policies. When the 
state policies are not functioning properly to meet the needs of the people, 
then, the individuals in the poor communities are denied access to the basic 
human security “freedom from want”. They are denied the access, 
protection and empowerment to the material or quantitative dimensions of 
human existence such as food, shelter, clothing, education and health 
care221. As a result, they turn to anyone that may provide these services to 
them and in this case the militia groups. 
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have seen that Kenya has experienced an exponential 
growth in population since independence as was seen in census data over the 
period. Kenya like many other sub-Saharan countries is also going through the 
second wave of urbanization, which has led to an increase in informal 
settlements especially in urban centres in most cities of the global South. This 
has resulted in an environment where poverty, unemployment, 
marginalisation, ethnic inequalities, economic disparity, and unequal 
distribution of national resources and services are commonplace. On the other 
hand the economic growth rate has not been at par with this increase in 
population. The government has been unable to match up to this increase in 
demand for its services.  
 
To meet this growing demand for services, alternative forces have emerged to 
fill the gap where the government has been found wanting. On the one hand 
private enterprises have come up to provide services such as security, garbage 
collection, water and sanitation among other services. However, the majority of 
the population who live in slum areas cannot afford or are unwilling to pay for 
commercial service providers. The above scenarios then exclude the urban 
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poor from service provision. As a result a third force has emerged to address 
the needs of these slum dwellers. These have been referred to as militia or 













These gangs are youth groups that have come together to provide those 
services to the community that the government has failed to provide and that 
they cannot afford from private providers. These include water, sanitation, 
electricity and security. These services are provided illegally but at a lower 
cost. This therefore becomes a cash cow for these gangs as they ran extortion 
rackets and control in informal settlements.  
 
Using two case studies; the Mungiki and SLDF we looked in detail at the 
formation, agenda and activities of militia groups. We noted that most of these 
groups have been in existence and have only recently changed their agenda and 
activities to take advantage of the poor service delivery situation in informal 
settlements. Therefore we can conclude that their proliferation is primarily in 
response to the frustrations of communities in need of basic services. The 
communities are turning to these groups that will address their needs. It has 
been seen that a relationship has thus developed between the communities and 
the criminal groups that is symbiotic; while the gangs provide the required 
services, the community and the status quo with regard to service delivery has 
become a breeding ground for criminal groups and means for their sustenance. 
The ineffectiveness of the government to deliver services has created a space in 















5. IMPACT OF STATE FRAGILITY ON 




In previous chapters we have looked at the structure of the Kenyan Government 
and then we discussed the activities of illegal criminal groups referred to as 
militia. In this chapter we look at the impact of state fragility in Kenya. This is in 
response to the second research question of this study: “…if the proliferation of 
organised criminal groups in Kenya is a function of state policy failure, then what 
are the implications of state failure on service delivery to the community?”  
 
In chapter 4 of this study, we deduced that as the population in post 
independence Kenya increased, the government was unable to keep with service 
delivery. Its finances were strained and as a result, the government has over the 
years concentrated more on providing services to the high-income areas of the 
country while socially excluding the population in the poorer slum areas.  Poor 
government policies resulted in neglect of the socio-economic challenges of slum 
dwellers. This it has been shown creates opportunities for criminal gangs to 
operate and proliferate in the communities. In this chapter we now investigate 
the impact of State fragility: Service Delivery Failure, Authority and Legitimacy 
Failure on communities. 
 
5.2 Elements of State Fragility 
As was discussed in chapter 2, there is no universally accepted definition of state 
fragility. However, different scholars and practitioners have tried to use various 
theories to bring out an understanding of this concept of fragility. Generally it 
has been agreed that a state is considered fragile when it fails to perform its 












failing, or at risk of failing with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service 
provision and legitimacy”222. From this definition we also get the causal link 
between the three dimensions of state fragility: Authority Failure, Service Failure 
and Legitimacy Failure.  
It was determined that Kenya falls in this category of fragile states.  
 
Authority failure we saw relates to a state that lacks the authority to protect its 
citizens from violence of various kinds. Service failure relates to a state that fails 
to ensure all citizens have access to basic services, while Legitimacy failure 
means the state enjoys only limited support among the people and is typically 
not democratic. We shall theoretically analyse in relation to Kenya.   
 









(Source: Stewart, F. and Brown, G. 2010. (ed.3).Fragile States. London: CRISE) 
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5.3 Impact of State Fragility on the Community in Kenya 
 5.3.1 Service Delivery Failure 
  
 Service Delivery Failure by the Local Government  
 
 
(Source (edited): Gerhard,V.L, Steffensen, J. and Naitore, H. (2007). Local Level Service 
Delivery, Decentralization, and Governance Case of Kenya. Denmark: JICA.) 
 
The Local Government Act Cap 265 (1963) and its subsequent 
amendments provides for administrative and legal powers, functions and 
responsibilities of Local Authorities (LAs), on the basis of decentralized 
authority. The law also provides for sources of revenues to finance the 
delegated functions. Local Authorities collect revenue from a variety of 
taxes, fees and charges within their area of jurisdiction and presently also 
receive resources from the central government through the Local 
Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF), operational since 1999/2000, and 
which now covers both a substantial part of their operational costs as 












resources from donors through various projects223. 
 
However, in practice, the LAs lack the resources for effective service 
delivery. Furthermore, the existing LA systems of planning and resource 
allocation have been largely inefficient in terms of addressing the service 
delivery needs. Most of the LATF funds are used for operational costs, e.g. 
in 2002/03 more than 65 % of the total LA revenues (including the 
grants) were spent on salaries and debt resolution at the LA level. As a 
result of this, the visible contribution of local authorities to service 
delivery is minimal224. 
 
Therefore, the poor financial management by local authorities, coupled 
with increase in population, and increase in demand of services by 
citizens has led to the decrease in government service provision. Good 
services are a core element of a social contract, which is defined by 
Brinkerhoff as “…a set of rules and institutions that link the state and 
society”225. The relationship between the state and the society is governed 
by this social contract. A breach in the social contract by either of the 
stakeholders weakens this relationship. The weakening of the 
relationship between the state and the society can be due to an abusive 
rule, unequal access to economic opportunities or ethnic exclusion and 
oppression of minorities. As a result, the state begins to drift away from 
the society, and a potential of state fragility begins to emerge. Therefore, 
when the social contract that governs the relationship between the state 
and the society diminishes, the downwards spiral of the state begins 
leading to fragility.  
 
As has been previously discussed, when the state fails to perform its basic 
functions, other non-state actors e.g. the civil society emerge to make 
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private provisions of the same public goods. However, the cost of 
providing such goods by the private sector exceeds the benefits226. As a 
result, the private sector mark up their prices to such an extent that the 
poor cannot afford. This erodes the basis for efficient markets, making the 
poor turn to other alternative forces that illegally provide these services 
at an affordable cost.  
 
Hence there is a reciprocal influence between service delivery and 
fragility. When the state policies on service provision fail to trickle down 
to the poor in the society, alternative criminal non-state actors such as the 
militia emerge to provide these services to the community. 
 
Impact of Service Failure on the community 
Because of state service delivery failure by omission or commission, the 
community has turned to alternative forces - the militia- to provide those 
services. But once embedded in the community, these gangs develop an 
appetite for crime and extortion, leading to their predation of community. 
And from this, their relationship with community becomes either 
parasitic or symbiotic.  
 
Parasitic relationship 
In this kind of relationship the militia groups depend on the community to 
survive. This relationship has been clearly demonstrated by the two-
militia groups we have studied: the SLDF and the Mungiki. According to a 
research done for UNDP (2010-2011) on sources of gang income in the 
community in Kenya, Gangs parasitic nature was seen in the revenue they 
collect from communities as seen below; 
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Table 6: Militia Relationship with Community 
Militia Relationship with Community & Sources of 
Revenue 
Average Percentage of 
Revenue 
Rank 
Militia Parasitic Relationship with community 
involves:  Extortion, Crime and Political Projects  
52.8% 1 
Militia symbiotic relationship with community 
involves: Investments in community, Levies on illegal 






(Source: UNDP study done by the consulting House in Kenya: Ngunyi et al (2011). From 
Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence. Nairobi: TCH) 
 
Therefore to survive, and accumulate, these gangs have to extort, engage 
in crime and act as political brokers. For example, we have seen that the 
SLDF forces community members to pay a certain fee to the militia group, 
or to surrender one of their sons for combat227. In the same way, the 
Mungiki collect levies from the public transport system and other 
businesses. Businessmen such as shop owners; vegetable vendors and 
other small business owners have to pay a certain amount to the militia 
group for them to operate in areas controlled by the Mungiki. The 
Mungiki also extort taxi drivers and conductors, for them to operate in 
their routes. In this case therefore, the relationship becomes parasitic. 
One party benefits more than the other; the Militia groups benefit at the 
expense of the community.  
 
Symbiotic relationship 
This is a relationship where there is a mutual dependence between the 
community and the militia groups, especially in areas of service provision 
such as security and supply of illegal services. According to the research 
done for UNDP on gang sources of income (represented in the table 
                                                     












above), the community identifies:  Investments in community, Levies on 
illegal services, Security provisioning, as symbiotic228. The community 
depends on gangs for illegal services such as water connections and 
electricity. And because of police absence, they also depend on gangs for 
security. These are business opportunities for the gangs resulting from a 
community demand. Hence, the two are seen as depending on each other 
with regards to security, provision of illegal services and community 
investments.  
 
5.3.2 Authority Failure 
One of the basic functions of a government is to provide security and 
protection to its citizens within its territory. The Constitution of Kenya states, 
“…National security is the protection of the territory of Kenya, its people, their 
property, rights and freedoms, and other national interests against internal and 
external threats”.229 However, during the post election violence of 
2007/2008, the government of Kenya failed to provide sufficient protection 
for its citizens as is required of them by the constitution. The police were 
unable to maintain law and order and were overwhelmed by the violence. 
This therefore created grounds for organic and organised criminal groups to 
operate as communities sort to protect themselves from aggressors. 
 
Further, due to government absence in the slum areas, ethnic violence 
continues to grow. Different ethnic militias are providing security and 
protection to their own community members at a fee. Any community 
member failing to pay the protection fee is therefore at a risk of attack by the 
militia groups. This kind of violence can be to the extreme of be-heading and 
skinning the victims. The government has been unable to contain this kind of 
violence, and provide security to the community members.  
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In Kenya, The Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) for instance, had to gang up 
members of the Soy sub-tribe of the Sabaot community in order to deal with 
the issue of land in the Mt. Elgon region. Land has been a problem in this 
region since the early 70s.  According to the Sabaot community, the 
government has been unfair in the distribution of land to the community 
members, favouring one sub-tribe over the other. In the phase III of the 
Chebyuk settlement scheme, this study has shown how the government 
favoured the Mosop sub-tribe over the Soy sub-tribe. The government 
forcefully ordered the Soy-tribe to surrender part of their land to the Mosop 
tribe. As a result, the Soy-tribe mobilised young people to defend their land 
from the injustices and discrimination of its allocation, thus leading to the 
formation of the SLDF. This is a militia group operating in the Mt. Elgon 
region with its own laws and system of administration. They provide security 
and protection to its people, as well as ensure no one illegally possesses land 
in the area without their approval. They have taken up the role of the 
government in this area in terms of protection and security.  
 
On the other hand, the Mungiki control most of the slums in Nairobi and the 
central province. They have taken over the slums and set up huge extortion 
rackets. The Mungiki claim that the government policies have neglected the 
poor in the slum areas and are only concerned with the welfare of the middle 
class and the rich in the society. As a result, essential services do not reach 
the poor giving the Mungiki opportunities to provide these services in the 
slums. The government has been unable to guarantee security and protection 
to the slum dwellers. Mungiki have therefore taken it upon themselves to 
provide protection services to the slum dwellers at a fee of KES 30 per 
month.  
 
Impact of Authority Failure 
The government is mandated provide protection to all citizens within its 
borders. Furthermore, when militia groups turn violent against the 
communities, it is the government responsibility to protect the communities. 












relationship with the government. Their presence is also beneficial to the 
politicians especially during election periods. The politicians use the militia 
gangs to rally support for their parties during elections. They use the militia 
groups to intimidate opponents and their supporters. As a result, the militia 
shifts alliances in the political arena depending on their political interests at 
the time, which is mainly to obtain political power, financial gain and status 
for their community. 
 
Therefore, the state’s sub-optimal response to the militia is a function of its 
embedded interest in the violence enterprise. The states are mainly the 
underwriters to the militia violence. Therefore, while the militia earn a living 
and prestige, the underwriters earn political power230. The relationship 
between the militia and the state can therefore be defined as symbiotic. The 
existence of one depends on the survival of the other. In this case, the 
existence of the political power of the leaders, especially during elections, 
depends on the survival of the militia groups as the instigators of violence 
against their opponents.  
 
According to a research done by Armed Conflict Location and Events Datasets 
(ACLED) on government response to incidence of violence in Kenya, it was 
noted that at times state intervention against militia activities is high, while 
other times it is low especially during election periods when the militia 
services are needed most by the political actors. The figure below represents 
this data. 
 
The blue graph on the figure below represents state interventions to curb 
violence. Logically, this graph must have an inverse relationship with the red 
graph. That is, in the event the blue one goes up, the red graph must logically 
go down. This is particularly true of the relationship between state security 
agencies and the criminal gangs. Yet there are moments when the 
relationship between the two is directly propotionate to one another. The 
higher the levels of state intervention, the more the gang violence. There are 
                                                     












many interpretations to this and one of them is that when the relationship is 
directly propotionate, then there is a pressupposed collaboration between 
the state agencies and the drivers of violence. 
 
Figure 7: State Vs. Insurgent Actors 
Source: ACLED Website231. 
 
Source : Armed Conflict Location and Events Datasets (ACLED). URL: http://www.acleddata.com/ 
 
According to the graph above, in the period before 1999, criminal gang activities 
were limited. However, State security activities went up and this is probably 
because SLDF and the militarized section of Mungiki were active at this time. 
Come 1999 criminal gang activities shot exponentially culminating in a record 
high in 2000 while state security agents’ activity went down. And this is probably 
because this is the point where state agencies and criminal gangs began to 
collaborate just before the 2002 elections. This is the period when Mungiki was 
recorded as having acquired some military Land Rovers from the Kanu 
government232.  
 
After the 2002 elections, there is a violence lull where criminal gang activities 
plateau. In 2004, however, the activities take a sharp dip, which is explained by 
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reduced operations by gangs working with the previously regime having to go 
under in the new regime. And with this dip, from 2002-2004, there is a sudden 
fall in state security agents’ activities. In 2005, activities of criminal gangs were 
lowest in spite of the constitutional referendum, while state security was high. 
Post referendum, ethnic tensions heighten and find expression in criminal gangs 
from 2005-2006. Ethnic expression heightens as the country approaches the 
2007 general election. In 2007-2008, there was suppression by state security, 
and in response there was decreased activity by criminal gangs.  
 
Therefore, from this analysis, it is important to note that state intervention on 
instances of militia proliferation and activities is value driven. The state will 
suppress the activities of the militia when there is no benefit they are deriving 
from them, however, when militia services are required by the state, the state 
intervention decreases, thus, showing an instance of authority failure on the part 
of the state. 
 
5.3.3 Legitimacy Failure 
Legitimacy failure means the state enjoys only limited support among the people 
and is typically not democratic. Service delivery is the heart of social contract. It 
keeps the leaders accountable to the citizens, and ensures their political support 
by the citizens based on the citizens’ satisfaction of the services provided to 
them233. A state therefore manifests its social contract with the citizens through 
implementation of its core functions that include maintenance of security, 
enabling economic development and provision of basic services to meet the 
needs of the population234.  
 
Provision of the basic core state functions by the non-state actors can have 
negative effects on the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. Therefore, the 
state needs to restore this accountability and legitimacy by taking responsibility 
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in making policy, contracting the non-state service providers and regulating and 
monitoring the services provided by the non-state actors. This needs a policy 
between the state and the service providers, which is normally known as a 
compact235. However, in the absence of an effective local authority policy 
framework, service delivery becomes fragmented. As a result, diminished central 
resources and declining control of services by the state gives prominence to 
these alternative and illegal non-state provisions236. As a result, both direct and 
indirect role of the state in service provision becomes poorly undertaken, due to 
the weak capacity to control and support the non-state service provision. 
 
To ensure efficient service delivery by the state, the goal of the citizens, the 
policy makers and the providers need to be satisfied. Therefore, this governance 
process should apply accountability relationship between the citizens and the 
leaders237. Accountability is a central element in service delivery. There should 
be accountability between the state and its citizens to ensure essential services 
and public goods are provided to the citizens by the state. Therefore, 
accountability between these two stakeholders should be defined.  A kind of 
policy should exist that specifies service delivery standards for the government 
and other service providers, monitoring and evaluation methods, as well as 
rewards and sanctions.  
 
In fragile states, this political mechanism of expressing public demand and 
accountability is poorly developed. The government capacity to meet its basic 
function is weak238. This further leads to weak service provision, which in turn 
weakens the society.  As a result, the citizens no longer support the state due to 
their dissatisfaction in the services provided by the state. Only then is the state 
considered to have failed with regards to legitimacy. 
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5.4  Summary 
In this chapter, we have shown that Kenya is one of the countries that are at risk of 
failing in all the three dimensions of state fragility; Authority, Legitimacy and 
Service delivery. We have shown how service delivery by the government of Kenya 
has been deteriorating since independence partly due to the increase in 
population, but largely due to poor governance and government policies. As a 
result of service delivery failure, we have demonstrated how other alternative 
forces-militia gangs- have emerged to provide services at a lower cost. 
Relationships have then been formed between the militia and the communities 
that are either symbiotic- where both the community and militia benefit, or 
parasitic- where only the militia benefits from the community.  
 
Further, with regards to authority, this chapter notes that the government of 
Kenya has failed to control violence of various kinds within its borders. Insecurity 
in Kenya has continued to increase as a result of government absence in its 
provisioning capacity as the provider of security to its citizens. This also has had 
impacts on the community. Instead of government getting rid of militia gangs that 
perpetuate the violence in the communities, the have rallied their support 
especially during the election periods. This therefore leaves the country at the risk 
of rapid rise of insecurity, and the growth and sustenance of militia gangs.  
 
Lastly, the government of Kenya has lost its legitimacy to its citizens due to failure 
to satisfy them through basic service provision. We have seen that for the 
government to regain its legitimacy among its people, it has to ensure that it 
performs its basic functions of providing basic services to its citizens effectively 



















6.1 Introduction and Background of study 
 
Kenya has in the recent past experienced a proliferation of militia groups that have 
especially manifested themselves amongst poor communities. Here, amongst the poor 
we have shown that these groups provide essential services like security, water supply, 
transport regulation, amongst other services coupled with highly organized extortion 
rackets. In some cases their existence has been appreciated by the community while in 
others loathed as they leach on helpless poor communities. Further still, their existence 
has now become a menace to the government and peace loving Kenyans. Their activities 
and agenda culminated in the Kenya post-election violence of 2007 that left several 
thousands dead and many more internally displaced persons. 
 
This thesis was investigating the existence of these militia groups, their agenda and 
activities to establish if their existence is a function of state policy failure. And if so, what 
the implications are on service delivery to the community? Therefore, the pursuit of 
better service delivery by the state to its citizens has been the focus of this research. 
This study has shown that service delivery is the heart of the social contract between a 
state and its citizens239. It keeps the leaders accountable to their citizens and ensures 






                                                     













6.2 Research Questions 
6.2.1 Is the proliferation of organic and organized criminal groups in Kenya a 
function of state policy failure? 
To answer this research question, we investigated the characteristics of an ideal 
state and fragile states. This helped us to understand state policy failure in the 
context of fragile state. More specifically we investigated service delivery failure 
as the avenue through which criminal groups have infiltrated communities.  
 
6.2.1.1 Fragile state: Authority, Legitimacy and Service Delivery Failure 
This study has shown that the concept of ‘fragile state’ is a relative concept 
suggesting a deviance and aberration from the ideal state. However, there is no 
universally accepted definition of fragile states. Different scholars and 
institutions have attempted to define the concept as states that lack the capacity 
to discharge their normal functions and drive forward development. Therefore, a 
state is seen as fragile when it fails to provide the basic needs to its citizens. In 
addition to not meeting the basic needs of its citizenry, it also lacks authority 
within its territory and lacks the democratic support of its citizens. Kenya ranked 
16 in the failed state index for 2012 in a report published annually by the 
Foreign Policy Magazine and the fund for peace. 
 
6.2.1.2 Basic Service Delivery Failure: Set of failed Government Policies 
Ranking highly in the failed state characteristics is the lack of a provisioning 
capacity of essential services by the government of Kenya to its growing 
population. Service delivery especially in the slum areas in Kenya is very poor. 
Many of the slum dwellers in Kenya have to walk many kilometers from their 
homes in search of clean water and sanitation, and generally do not have 
electricity. Further, there are no proper social amenities provided for the slum 
dweller. Schools have poor infrastructure and no sufficient educational 
materials. Students have to walk long distances in search of better education. In 
most cases, even this education provided in proper school facilities they cannot 
afford. More so, health care is wanting in the slums. Most of the people cannot 













The population in the slums therefore suffers social exclusion. They are excluded 
from the mainstream service delivery by the government. Water, electricity, 
education, proper health care and other basic services provided by the 
government are either too expensive for ordinary slum dwellers or not provided 
at all.  
 
We therefore investigated why the government has failed to provide basic 
services to the urban poor. A study of the history of Kenya and its demographics 
revealed that the population of Kenya has grown exponentially since 
independence in 1963 to its current 40+ million Kenyans. However, government 
services have declined since independence especially to the poor population. 
This has been attributed primarily to population growth and the second wave of 
urbanization which has led to the growth of slums in many sub-Saharan cities. 
The government has been unable to match this growth and it has been unable to 
deliver services adequately to the urban poor. It’s financial and management 
capacity to match the growth in population is weak and some of the old 
government policies dealing with service delivery have not been revised to adapt 
to the new challenges facing the country. The policy making process and 
implementation has not matched the growth of cities and population growth. 
Therefore many communities have been left in want of basic services like 
security, clean water and sanitation. It was concluded that the government finds 
itself in this undesirable position due to a set of failed policies to deal with 
population growth, urbanization and service delivery. 
 
The Government’s failure in Service delivery has not been without its 
consequences. Its inability to meet its end of the social contract it has with its 
citizens has led to the emergence of alternative forces that have almost 
completely taken over service delivery amongst the poor. These are Legal private 
enterprises and illegal criminal groups that have arisen to filled the vacuum of 














6.2.1.3 Alternative Forces 
a) Private Enterprise 
Private enterprises have come up to provide services such as security, 
garbage collection, water and sanitation among other services. These are 
especially popular in middle income and high-income residential areas that 
can afford their services, as they are often better and more reliable than the 
government services. However, these were not the focus of this thesis. We 
looked at the majority of the population who live in slum areas who cannot 
afford or are unwilling to pay for commercial service providers.  
 
b) Proliferation of Militia/Criminal Groups in Kenya 
Criminal groups referred to as militia groups were the focus of this thesis. 
These have emerged as an alternative for the poor who cannot afford private 
services providers and have been excluded by the government service 
delivery policies. To understand the nature of this third force we studied the 
Mungiki and SLDF in detail to understand their agenda and activities. 
 
There are more than 30 militia groups in Kenya with the most dominant 
being the “BIG SIX”: Mungiki, Taliban, Mombasa Republican Council, Sungu 
Sungu, Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), and the Kamjesh. These militia 
groups are either classified as state militias or non-state militias240. The state 
militias are organised in defence of a political order, or fight on behalf of the 
state and state functionalities. Therefore their agenda and purpose of 
existence and proliferation is mainly state centric241. On the other hand, the 
non-state militias are ‘privately’ organized armed groups. They are not part 
of the regular army of the state. They are composed of ordinary citizens who 
organize themselves to combat certain threats and security issues. They have 
no regular salary, or a fixed term of service. They are mostly ethnically 
oriented and seek to protect the interests of their own communities. 
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We studied the operations of these militia groups in the Mathare and Kibera 
slums of Kenya. As the study has shown, the Mungiki are the most dominant 
militia groups in these slum areas. They have taken advantage of the failure 
of the government to provide essential services to these slums. They 
therefore end up in control of most of the Nairobi slums preying on the poor, 
by running huge extortion rackets. In the slum areas, the Mungiki provide 
electricity by stealing it from the Kenya power and lighting company and 
bringing it to the slums. They charge the slum dwellers a fee per bulb per 
month for them to access the electricity. Further, they provide protection 
services to the slum dwellers242 asking for protection money those living in 
their areas of operation.  By doing so, they believe that they are playing a role 
which the government has failed to play. They therefore see themselves as 
essential to the community.  
 
In some instances, the community appreciates the presence of the Mungiki 
because they offer them protection, security and food. Therefore, a symbiotic 
relationship is formed between the militia group and the community. The 
survival of one depends on the existence of the other. The Mungiki depend on 
the levies they get from the community, and the community depends on the 
militia group for their safety and food. On the other hand the relationship is 
parasitic where the Mungiki forcefully collects money from the community 
through extortion rackets especially in the transport sector and ‘protection 
fees’. 
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Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF) 
Similarly, in the Mt. Elgon region in Kenya, the Sabaot Land Defense Force 
(SLDF) provides security and protection to the population residing in these 
areas. Due to the government absence in the Mt. Elgon region in 2006-2008 
as a result of the land clashes that had erupted in the area, the SLDF made its 
own laws that the inhabitants had to obey243. The SLDF established an 
administration system complete with mechanisms for levying illegal taxes244. 
They formed informal courts that punished those who were suspected to 
have acquired land illegally. In many ways their operations are similar to 
those of their Mungiki counter parts. They forcefully collect taxes from the 
people. Further, Mt. Elgon being an agricultural area, the SLDF collects part of 
the food produce for every unit area harvested245. They also collect levies 
from public service vehicles. These sources of income have made SLDF 
attractive to the unemployed lower class youth. This study has shown that 
originally the aim of the SLDF was to evict non-indigenous people from Mt. 
Elgon as they believe it belonged to the Sabaot and the Kamatusa 
communities. However their activities have changed over time into service 
provision as explained above. 
 
Again, like the Mungiki, their relationship with the community is both 
parasitic and symbiotic; Parasitic in the sense that they depend on the 
community to finance their existence symbiotic in that the community needs 
them for their own security. The absence of a state mechanism to tackle their 
problems has left the area wide open for the occupation and proliferation of 
illegal militia groups like the SLDF.  
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6.2.2 If so, what are the implications on service delivery to the 
community? 
To the first question, “Is the proliferation of organic and organized criminal groups in 
Kenya a function of state policy failure?”  We answered YES. Then the implications of 
the proliferation of militia groups on service delivery to the community can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
As this study has illustrated, a state manifests its social contract with the citizens 
through implementation of its core functions that includes maintenance of security, 
enabling economic development and provision of basic services to meet the needs of 
the population246. On the other hand, state fragility weakens service provision by the 
government and leads to other non-state actors rising to fill in the gap created by 
state policy failure247. 
 
Therefore, provision of basic services by non-state actors has a negative effect on the 
state, while at the same time having a positive effect on the community. With 
regards to the state, the provision of basic core functions of the state by non-state 
actors has negative effects on the accountability, legitimacy and sovereignty of the 
state. The state becomes irrelevant to its citizens, especially those affected by poor 
service provision. As a result, they lose their legitimacy over their citizens. The 
population no longer trusts the ability of the state to meet their basic needs, and 
therefore the state loses their support.  
 
However, when alternative forces emerge, a kind of relationship is formed between 
the alternative non-state actors and the community. This relationship has positive 
effects on the community in that; the community members can now enjoy the 
services that they once lacked. Access to basic services such as water, electricity, 
food and security is made available to the community by these alternative forces at a 
lower rate that the community members can afford. 
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Although the non-state actors illegally provide these services, the community enjoys 
them. The state on the other hand is unable to get rid of these alternative forces 
from operating in the low-income population because of the symbiotic relationship 
that exists between them and the community. Therefore, the state is only left with 
the option of coming up with better policies that will integrate the services provided 
by the non-state actors with the state basic functions.  
 
Therefore, to ensure efficient service delivery by the state to its citizens, the goals of 
the citizens as well as those of the non-state service providers have to be met. In this 
case, a new form of social contract needs to be established between the state, the 
citizens and the non-state actors to ensure the goals of all the stakeholders are met. 
The state has to come up with a strategy on how to work together with the 
alternative forces to provide the basic services to the low-income population at an 
affordable rate.  
 
In this case, the state should develop policies that will ensure the needs of the 
people; especially those in the slum areas are met. However, these policies should 
also ensure that the state is working together with these militia groups already 
embedded in the community to ensure effective and efficient service provision. This 
can be achieved by the state contracting out the militia groups to act as their agents 
in providing the basic services to the community. Otherwise, they may experience 
resistance from both the community members and the militia groups and may not 
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